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Case No. 920653-CA 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES/REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Ellen Anderson, individually and as the personal 
representative of the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott (hereinafter 
"Plaintiffs"), submit this brief in response to the cross-appeal of defendant Eugene Doms and 
in reply to Doms' response to their brief. 
CROSS-APPELLEES' RESPONSE BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The facts and law which establish the jurisdiction of this court are set forth in the Brief 
of Appellants at page 1. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues which Plaintiffs presented in their appeal appear at pages 1 through 3 of the 
Brief of Appellants. On the cross-appeal, Doms raises six issues, each subdivided into several 
"subissues." In essence, Plaintiffs' believe that Doms presents the following new issues in his 
cross-appeal: 
1. Was the trial court correct when it ruled rescission was not available to Doms? 
2. Was the trial court correct when it concluded that the warranty deed and trust 
deed and trust deed note did not constitute a single contract and that Doms was not excused from 
performance under the trust deed and trust deed note? 
3. Was the trial court correct in awarding Doms a lower amount of damages than 
he requested? 
4. Was the trial court correct in ruling that Doms' counterclaim was time-barred by 
the probate nonclaim statute? 
5. Were the trial court's findings of fact that Doms was not entitled to attorney's fees 
and costs erroneous? 
6. Were the trial court's findings of fact that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorney' s fees 
and costs clearly erroneous? 
Standards of Review: Doms has misstated the standard of appellate review for many 
of the issues which he presents. Doms initially asserts that all of the issues present questions 
of law and therefore should be reviewed for correctness. However, Doms subsequently modifies 
that statement and concedes that issues 1,3,5 and 6 should be governed by an abuse of discretion 
standard. However, even Doms' concession is erroneous with respect to some of the issues. 
Several of the issues presented by Doms, namely issues 1, 3, 5 and 6, either contest 
findings of fact made by the trial court or present mixed issues of fact and law. Findings of fact 
entered by a trial court are not to be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah 
R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a). A finding is affirmed if it is based on sufficient evidence when the 
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evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction. West Valley City 
v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). To demonstrate that a finding 
of fact is clearly erroneous, the party attacking the finding must first marshal all of the evidence 
which supports the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). To demonstrate 
that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding, the party challenging the finding may not 
merely rely on contradictory evidence. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah 
1985). An appellate court may affirm the trial court if the appellant (or, in this case, the cross-
appellant) fails to adequately marshal the evidence which supports the finding or presents only 
evidence which is conflicting or ignores the supporting evidence. West Valley City. 818 P.2d 
at 1313; Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In each of the instances 
identified above, Doms has totally failed to marshal the evidence which supports the finding and 
therefore, his arguments which are based mostly on contradictory evidence should not be 
considered by this court. 
In other instances, the issues identified by Doms should be reviewed according to an 
abuse of discretion standard. Seftel v. Capital City Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Finally, other issues presented by Doms involve conclusions of law made by the trial 
court which are reviewed for legal correctness without deference to the trial court's conclusions. 
Bailev v. Call. 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules pertinent to the issues presented 
for review is contained in the body of this brief or in the addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Statement of the Case is set forth in detail in the Brief of Appellant at pages 4 through 6. 
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FACTS 
The facts of this case are set forth in the Brief of the Appellant at pages 6 through 11. 
However, in his brief, Doms has misstated relevant facts. In some instances the facts are set 
forth in detail in the body of this brief in an effort to rectify Doms' misstatements. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court found that rescission was not available to Doms. Doms has assailed the 
trial court's findings but has failed to marshal the evidence as he is required to do. Rescission 
was not available to Doms because at the time he requested rescission he was not the owner of 
the property and the contract which he sought to rescind was an executed contract. Doms' delay 
of over six years in seeking rescission was too long and he waived his right to rescission. 
Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the delay. Doms' argument that the plaintiffs came to court with 
unclean hands ignores the trial court's holding that he presented insufficient evidence to prove 
fraud by the plaintiffs. 
The trial court held the sale and finance of a portion of the sale price were two separate 
transactions involving different parties. The case law supports the trial court's holding that 
different transactions occurred. Doms' failure to make payments and pay taxes meant that he 
was in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. Because different parties were involved 
in the two transactions, the doctrine of setoff cannot be applied to this case. Because the trial 
court determined the ultimate value of the land, Doms was not entitled to prejudgment interest. 
If Doms is awarded damages, a double recovery will have resulted because Doms would 
have sold the land for consideration which he deemed appropriate and recovered for a claimed 
breach of the covenant against encumbrances. Furthermore, Doms is entitled to no damages 
because he knew of the easements and encumbrances before he purchased the land. If the trial 
court's ruling on the issue of damages was correct, then Doms is entitled to no more damages 
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than awarded by the trial court because the damages awarded were within the range of values 
supported by testimony at the trial. Despite Doms' claims to the contrary, he was afforded 
ample opportunity to review an expert's documents and depose the expert. 
Doms' action amounted to a "claim" against the estate of D. C. Anderson within the 
meaning of the non-claim statute. Doms' original claim was not one which could be considered 
"purely equitable." Therefore, the trial court's ruling that Doms "claim" was time-barred by 
the non-claim statute was correct. 
The trial court correctly held that Doms is not entitled to attorney fees because no basis 
exists for an award of attorney fees to Doms. Doms cannot claim attorney fees as consequential 
damages because the case law establishes that fees recoverable as damages must have been 
incurred in litigation with a third party which did not occur in this case. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to award fees to Doms and Doms should not be awarded fees on 
this appeal. 
The trial court correctly awarded attorney fees to the plaintiffs but should have awarded 
substantially more fees to them because of Doms' stubbornly litigious conduct. The award of 
attorney fees to plaintiffs was based on the trust deed and trust deed note which contained 
provisions providing for an award of such fees. Doms' conduct during the proceedings, 
including discovery, which caused Judge Frederick to sanction Doms, is responsible for the large 
fees incurred in this case. Substantial additional fees should have been awarded to plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RESCISSION 
WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO DOMS. 
Doms did not file a formal request for rescission until he filed his answer and 
5 
counterclaim on January 29, 1988. (R.41) However, because of the default judgment which 
had been entered against him, the answer and counterclaim were not accepted by the court until 
June 1, 1988, over six years after the transaction which Doms sought to rescind. (R. 76-78) 
Before the trial on the issue of damages, the court held a trial on the issue of rescission and 
denied Doms' request for rescission. Conclusions by the trial court on the rescission issue were 
supported by findings of fact made by the trial court which are discussed below. (R. 6894-96) 
In his brief Doms argues that the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of laches to 
determine that rescission was not available as a remedy. Doms specifically claims that: (1) 
rescission was the appropriate remedy because of Plaintiffs' breach of statutory warranties and 
covenants in the warranty deed; (2) rescission was appropriate because of Plaintiffs' alleged 
misrepresentation of material facts prior to the transaction; (3) laches should not have been 
applied because Doms claims that he acted "promptly" to rescind; (4) laches should not have 
been applied because Doms attempted to mitigate his damages; (5) laches should not have been 
applied because Plaintiffs did not establish that they were prejudiced by any delay; and (6) laches 
should not have been applied because Doms claims that Plaintiffs have "unclean hands" in the 
transaction. As will be shown below, none of Doms' claims provides a basis to reverse the trial 
court. Additionally, the trial court's decision on rescission should be affirmed because Doms' 
assertions are assaults on findings of fact made by the trial court, however, he has not 
demonstrated in any instance that the findings are clearly erroneous as required by Rule 52 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court's ruling on the issue should be upheld for 
other reasons including the facts that at the time Doms requested rescission, he was not the 
owner of the property and the only contract that could be rescinded, the deed, was an executed, 
not an executory, contract. The trial court's ruling on rescission was correct and supported by 
the facts. 
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A. Doms Has Not Marshaled the Evidence to Demonstrate That the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact Are Clearly Erroneous. 
The trial court's conclusions that Doms was not entitled to invoke rescission are based 
on several findings made by the trial court. For example, in the Second Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found: 
33. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate 
agent, in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the 
Rossie [sic] Hills Property. 
34. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, 
one of the sellers of the Rossie [sic] Hills Property, once before 
Doms and McCoy purchased the property. 
35. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the 
property was a prime piece of development property and its 
highest and best use would be as an integrated development with 
the two adjoining parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper 
parcel. 
36. Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest 
in the Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
37. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and 
McCoy to further the integrated development of the three parcels 
and to equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper 
parcel and Block 62. 
40. Doms knew or should have known at the time he 
purchased the Rossie [sic] Hills Property and the Slipper parcel 
that the integrated development of the three parcels had failed 
because of the problems with the Rossi Hills property and the 
inability of the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each 
parcel 
41. Doms walked the Rossi Hills property with Mr. 
Sloan in the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds 
on the property. 
42. Mr. Sloan informed Defendant Doms that the 
encroachments would not affect development and an access road 
to the property would be in the same place as the loop road. 
43. Doms had actual notice of the easement 
encroachments for the first time sometime between October 22, 
1981, and November 7, 1981, and had further notice during 1982 
and up and through 1984. 
44. Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind 
until January of 1985, and said notice was sent by way of a 
settlement offer in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due 
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on January 25, 1985. . . . 
46. Doms' purchase of Slipper parcel the negotiations 
to develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Rossi Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
47. It was not until Plaintiffs' action to foreclose was 
filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June 
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed. 
(R. 6882-84) (emphasis added). 
For the most part Doms' claims concerning the trial court's ruling on the issue of 
recession are attacks on the findings of the court. However, the findings set forth above which 
form the basis for the trial court's conclusions that Doms was barred by his own lack of 
diligence from rescinding the transaction are not even mentioned in Doms' brief. Doms' failure 
to confront these critical findings by the trial court means that he has also obviously not 
demonstrated them to be clearly erroneous by marshalling the evidence which supports them and 
then showing that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. What Doms presents in 
support of his arguments on recession is only evidence which is contradictory to the findings. 
However, this court has clearly stated that failure of an appellant (or cross-appellant) to marshal 
all of the supporting evidence or presentation of merely contradictory evidence is, in itself, an 
adequate basis for affirming the trial court. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1313. This court 
should apply that standard and affirm the trial court's ruling on rescission with no further 
consideration of Doms' claims. 
B. Rescission Was Not Available to Doms Because He Did Not Own and Therefore Could Not 
Tender the Subject Property. 
Doms also fails to address a critical issue which was raised in the trial court by the 
Plaintiffs but, because of its resolution of the recession issue, not ruled on by the trial court. (R. 
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4051-4123) That issue concerns the ownership of the parcel at issue in this case. At the time 
Doms filed his pleadings requesting rescission he had no right, title or interest in Rossi Hills. 
Doms and McCoy had originally owned the property as tenants in common, but they had 
transferred their interest in the property to Summit County Title Company as trustee, (Exhibit 
2) and thereafter, they transferred any unencumbered interest in the property to Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc. by warranty deed. (Exhibit 16) Subsequently, as a result of Domcoy's failure 
to pay taxes, the property was sold to Summit County on May 27, 1987. 
A contract cannot be rescinded unless the seller and the buyer can be placed in the 
original positions which existed before the contract. 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment 
Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1989). In cases involving transfers of property the Utah 
Supreme court has stated, "The law is well settled that one electing to rescind a contract must 
tender back to the other contracting party whatever property of value he has received." Perry 
v. Woodall. 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968). 
In this case, because Doms had transferred the property before the rescission offer, he 
did not have title and could not tender the property as part of a recession offer. Therefore, the 
rescission offer itself was a nonsequitur. As an additional complicating factor, Doms originally 
only received an undivided one-half interest in the property and McCoy, the other one-half 
owner, has made no appearance in this case and has clearly not made any request for rescission 
or tender of property. Further, Doms cannot correct any title deficiency because the one-half 
interest in the property owned by his partner McCoy was sold at sheriffs sale and is not now 
available to Doms so rescission is not available. (R.46; 568-9; 1200-03). Therefore, a question 
arises concerning Doms' ability to rescind one-half of a contract.1 
1
 This matter was presented to the court in the plaintiffs trial brief. (R. 4051-4123) 
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Because of the trial court's resolution of the rescission issue, it did not reach the issue 
of Doms' ownership of Rossi Hills. However, a trial court's decision may be affirmed on 
grounds other than those on which the trial court decided the issue. That principle should be 
applied in this case to affirm the trial court based on Doms' inability to return Plaintiffs to their 
original position because he did not own the property. 
C. Rescission Is Not Available Because the Only Contract Is the Deed. (Doms Point I A&B) 
The transaction involving the warranty deed which Doms sought to rescind was an 
executed, not an executory, contract. Doms often cites cases arising under executory contracts 
such as in Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984), wherein the cause of action arose 
under a real estate contract but the deed was held in escrow. The real estate contract could not 
be performed and therefore, the court allowed the termination of the contract. Adams v. Reed, 
40 P. 720 (Utah 1895), involved an executory contract where the deed issued but improperly 
described the property. Explaining when rescission is allowed in such cases, the court stated: 
[EJquity will not decree rescission of an executed contract, in the 
absence of moral fraud, and . . . where the contract is a warranty 
deed, and it is executed by the necessary parties, the purchaser 
has no remedy, either in law or in equity, in respect to defects in 
title, or quantity or quality of the estate, which are not covered by 
the vendor's covenants. . . . [I]t is conceded, when the contract is 
still executory, the power of equity to decree rescission is ample. 
. . . "a contract is executory when the thing agreed has not been 
done. It is executed when the thing has been done. . . . " 
. . . [Defendants] contracted for a warranty deed to a 
certain tract of land. The contract was not fully performed by 
plaintiffs. It was executory. 
40 P. at 723-24 (emphasis added). 
In Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme court stated: 
The doctrine of merger, which this Court recognizes, is applicable 
when the acts to be performed by the seller in a contract relate 
only to the delivery of title to the buyer. Execution and delivery 
of a deed by the seller then usually constitute full performance on 
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his part, and acceptance of the deed by the buyer manifests his 
acceptance of that performance even though the estate conveyed 
may differ from that promised in the antecedent agreement. 
Therefore, in such a case, the deed is the final agreement and all 
prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and 
unenforceable, 
567 P.2d at 169 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the evidence shows that Doms not only viewed the property and the 
encumbrances prior to consummating the transaction but that he viewed the property in the 
company of the real estate agent who drove him into the property over the easement that he now 
claims violated the deed covenants and the intrusions or encumbrances were known to him. (R. 
7661, 7664, 7667-8) Indeed, the trial court specifically found that Doms knew "there were 
roads and sheds on the property" and that he had "actual knowledge of the easement 
encroachments" before he entered into the transaction. (R.6883) 
Doms not only viewed the property before purchasing it but he changed the purchase 
terms from those contained in an earnest money agreement. (Exhibit 63) The contract was 
finally culminated with a deed to him and his partner and an unpaid balance of the purchase 
price was financed in a separately executed trust deed and promissory note. Obviously the 
purchasers, McCoy and Doms, must now rely on the provisions of the deed. Obligations arising 
by reason of execution of the deed cannot be used as a basis for rescinding the deed which 
would rescind the very obligation that Doms claims give rise to his damage. 
All representations and negotiations prior to the deed merged into the deed. In Embassy 
Group Inc.. v. Hatch, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the court considered a case 
with many factual similarities. The court stated, "Execution and delivery of a deed by the seller 
then usually constitute full performance . . . even though the estate conveyed may differ from 
that promised in the antecedent agreement." 227 Utah Adv. Rep. at 61. The court reviewed 
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Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986), and stated, "[M]erger may seem harsh but serves 
the purpose of "presenting] the integrity of the final document of conveyance and encourag[ing] 
the diligence of the parties." 227 Utah Adv. Rep. at 61. New rights arise by reason of the 
deed. Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). 
D. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Doms' Failure to Promptly Request Rescission 
Waived His Right to Seek Rescission. (Doms Point I-C&D) 
Rescission is an equitable remedy and therefore, to "repair" damage as quickly as 
possible by restoring the parties to their original positions, courts have always required prompt 
notification of intent to rescind. Doms argues that his notice of rescission in this case was 
promptly made after he "obtain[ed] knowledge" of the encumbrances. However, Doms admits 
the rescission request was not filed for at least three years after the purchase. 
As previously stated, the court found that Doms "knew or should have known at the time 
he purchased the Rossi Hills Property and the Slipper parcel that the integrated development of 
the three parcels had failed . . .." (R. 6882) The court also found that Doms knew that "there 
were roads and sheds on the property." (R. 6883) Finally, the court specifically found that 
Doms had "actual notice of the easement encroachments between October 22, 1981 and 
November 7, 1981" and that Doms' subsequent actions demonstrate that he had "personal 
knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than October of 1982." (R. 6883) Based on 
these and other findings, the court concluded that Doms waited an unreasonable amount of time 
after he had knowledge of the road and other encroachments to seek rescission and therefore, 
rescission was barred. 
Doms does not acknowledge the trial court's findings on this issue. Rather, Doms 
presents a collection of bits and pieces of evidence which contradict the findings. Because Doms 
has failed to marshal the evidence which supports the findings and has instead presented only 
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contradictory evidence, this court should affirm the trial court. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 
1313. However, even if the court chooses to substantively address the issue, the trial court's 
holding must be affirmed. 
Doms relies primarily onBreuer-Harrison. Inc., v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), to argue that his long wait before seeking rescission did not evidence a lack of diligence 
on his part. For example, Doms states that in Breuer-Harrison. this court affirmed the trial 
court's granting of rescission even though the buyers had delayed five years in seeking rescission 
after they obtained knowledge of an easement on the property which they were purchasing. 
Doms' interpretation of Breuer-Harrison is inaccurate. In Breuer-Harrison. the court's opinion 
states that the evidence clearly established that the buyers did not know of an underground 
easement across the property which they had purchased in 1979 until "sometime in 1983." 799 
P.2d at 724. The opinion further states that the buyers first raised the "option of rescinding the 
contract" in August, 1984, perhaps less than one year after discovery of the easement. 799 P.2d 
at 722. The opinion then notes that shortly after August, 1984, buyers filed their action seeking 
to rescind the contract.2 Therefore, contrary to Doms' assertion, Breuer-Harrison does not 
support his position that a five-year wait for rescission is permissible, rather, Breuer-Harrison 
supports the proposition that buyers must act promptly and diligently in seeking rescission. 
Other cases support the position that a buyer must promptly notify a seller of his or her 
intent to rescind. For example, in Erisman v. Overman. 358 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1961), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a ten-month delay between the time the buyer discovered problems with 
the property and the time she expressed a desire to rescind the contract was too long a period 
2The opinion is somewhat confusing on this issue because it also intimates that perhaps 
the action had not been filed until 1987, some four years after the buyers discovered the 
easement. 799 P.2d at 726 
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to allow rescission. In Perry v. Woodall. 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 1968), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that after the buyer was informed of the liabilities of the business four months after his 
offer to purchase, he elected to retain possession of the corporate assets and to "carry on the 
business until it was taken over in the receivership proceeding." 438 P.2d 815. The court held 
that the buyer waited too long and could not avail himself of the remedy of rescission. Id. 
In Perry and Erisman. the Utah Supreme Court held that a delay of mere months in 
exercising a decision to rescind was a sufficient delay to prohibit invocation of rescission. In 
this case, at least three years expired before the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., 
discussed rescission with Plaintiffs' attorneys and more than six years before Mr. Doms 
individually requested rescission. Doms simply waited too long to invoke rescission. The trial 
court was correct in its conclusion that Doms was barred from invoking rescission. 
Doms attempts to justify his unreasonable delay in seeking rescission by arguing that 
Plaintiffs' misrepresentations "induced him to purchase Rossi Hills" and form a sufficient basis 
for rescission. Doms fails to acknowledge that (1) he introduced insufficient evidence of any 
misrepresentation, (2) the trial court found that Doms was aware of the actual facts surrounding 
the property at least four months before he purchased the property, (3) Doms' continued 
payments after he knew of the facts waived any claim of rescission, and (4) the caselaw holds 
that a party seeking rescission based on misrepresentation must act within a reasonable time after 
the truth is revealed. 
The trial court concluded that Doms had produced insufficient evidence to prove his 
allegations that some of the Plaintiffs had made material misrepresentations concerning Rossi 
Hills. (R. 6896) This conclusion was based, in part, on the statement of Doms' counsel during 
the second trial that Doms did "not intend to call any witnesses with respect to fraud and 
misrepresentation and that should resolve that." (R. 7763) In his brief Doms simply rehashes 
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the same evidence which the trial court stated was insufficient to support the allegations of fraud 
and misrepresentation.3 (R. 7764) 
As previously stated, the trial court found that Doms had actual notice of the easement 
encroachments in the Fall of 1981, some four months before he purchased Rossi Hills, and that 
he had personal knowledge of the "road and encroachments no later than October of 1982," 
seven months after his purchase of the property. (R.6882-84) Finally, the court also found that 
during the same period of time Doms "knew or should have known" that the integrated 
development of the three parcels had failed. Doms' brief simply fails to recognize these findings 
by the trial court. Doms clearly did not act promptly to rescind. 
Doms continued to make payments under the contract for approximately six years. On 
this point, Thompson Real Property §4465 states: 
. . . The right to rescind for fraud is waived where the party 
having such right, after knowledge of the fraud, accepts any 
benefit of the contract or does any other act implying attempt to 
abide by or affirm the contract. His right to rescind will be denied 
if after discovering the fraud he continues to make payments and 
use the property, assign the contract or leases the property. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah cases follow this approach. For example, in Taylor v. Moore. 51 P.2d 222 (Utah 1935), 
after the buyer learned of misrepresentations made by the seller, he continued to make payments 
and enjoy the use of the property for over two years. Six months later, nearly three years after 
learning of the misrepresentations, the buyer filed an action for rescission. 51 P.2d at 227. The 
3
 Doms does not disclose that the alleged material misrepresentations cited were 
statements made prior to the purchase of the property. Other alleged material representations 
were opinions concerning the best use of the property. Not one of the eleven statements 
Doms claims to be misrepresentations rises to the level of being a "material 
misrepresentation." Doms also fails to reveal that the only fraud which he ever alleged 
concerned the label "special" attached to the warranty deed. 
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Utah Supreme Court held that the buyer waited too long to rescind the transaction. The court 
enunciated the general rule as follows: "The party deceived is not allowed to go on deriving all 
possible benefit from the transaction, and then claim to be relieved from his own obligations by 
seeking its rescission." 51 P.2d at 227 quoting 4 R.C.L. 514 (emphasis added). 
Doms ratified the contract by continuing to make payments for a number of years and 
continuing to develop a joint plan with adjoining land owners Only six years later, after real 
estate prices had substantially decreased, and Doms had failed to develop a three-party 
agreement did he seek rescission.4 
E. Plaintiffs Were Prejudiced by the Delay. (Doms Point IE) 
The assertion of laches requires a showing of (1) unreasonable delay in bringing the 
action and (2) prejudice against the other party caused by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 
P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). Doms asserts that laches was incorrectly applied because Plaintiffs 
suffered no prejudice by the delay. 
Doms' argument ignores evidence presented at the trial which indicated that the value of 
the real estate had depreciated to about 37% of the original value by the time of the action. (R. 
7825, 7937) Indeed, Doms only sought recession when he could not develop the three parcels 
and the value of the land made it a liability rather than an asset. Certainly, the decreased value 
4
 Finding of Fact #44 states that Doms gave notice of his intent to rescind in January 
1985 by way of a settlement offer. However, Finding No. 47 states Doms sought to rescind 
in June 1988. Several problems not addressed by the court surround the 1985 date. First, 
neither Doms nor the court can point to any written offer to rescind before June 1988. 
Further, the settlement offer was made at a time when Doms had no right, title or interest in 
the real estate. If the offer of settlement could be considered an offer of rescission and 
tender of the property, the offer would have been made by Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., the 
then record title owner, and not by Doms. Doms did not make any offer of rescission until 
after he filed his counterclaim in a suit to foreclose a trust deed and even then, he did not 
have the ownership in the property and could not have made an appropriate tender. In any 
event, even if the 1985 date is accepted, Doms did not promptly request rescission and 
waived any right to recession by treating the property as his own. 
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of the land prejudiced the Plaintiffs because Doms could not place them in the same position 
they occupied before the transaction. Further, the failure of Doms to conclude the three-party 
development damaged the property's potential and this failure cannot be attributed to the 
Plaintiffs who warned him of the difficulties. 
F. The Unclean Hands Doctrine Does Not Apply. (Doms' Point I-F) 
Doms also argues that laches cannot be applied against him because he alleges that 
Plaintiffs have come to court with "unclean hands." He contends that Plaintiffs have unclean 
hands because of the misrepresentations allegedly made by them and because Plaintiffs did not 
remedy defects in the title before conveying the property. 
Doms' claim involving the alleged misrepresentations is addressed above. The trial court 
specifically held that Doms presented insufficient evidence to substantiate his allegations. 
Furthermore, as previously noted, Doms knew the truth of all of the "misrepresentations" before 
or, at the latest, shortly after he entered into the transaction. Further, the representations that 
are claimed to constitute unclean hands are all representations that were merged into the deed. 
With respect to Doms' claim that Plaintiffs should have cleared title, no contract preceded the 
deed; therefore, there could have been no breach of the contract conditions. In summary, the 
trial court's decision to deny rescission should be sustained. 
G. This Court Should Sustain the Trial Court's Decision on Rescission. 
As indicated in Papanikolas v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center. 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), 
appellate courts should generally not interfere with a trial court's determination of laches: 
The existence of laches is one to be determined primarily 
by the trial court; and reviewing courts will not interfere with the 
exercise of the trial court's discretion in the matter, unless it 
appears that a manifest injustice has been done, or the decision 
cannot reasonable be found to be supported by the evidence. 
535 P.2d at 1260 (emphasis added). In this case the district court tried the issue of recession 
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first and stated that Doms waited too long "to bring an action to rescind, or even notify about 
rescission, then that ends the case." (R. 7524) 
POINT II 
THE SALE AND THE FINANCING OF A PORTION OF THE 
SALE PRICE CONSTITUTED TWO SEPARATE 
TRANSACTIONS BY DIFFERENT PARTIES AND DOMS WAS 
IN DEFAULT UNDER THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED 
NOTE. 
(Doms Point II) 
Doms next contends that the trial court erroneously ruled that the warranty deed, trust 
deed, and trust deed note did not constitute a single contract or transaction. Furthermore, Doms 
complains that this led to the court's ruling that Doms was not excused from performance under 
the trust deed and trust deed note because of his default under those instruments. In addition, 
Doms asserts that Plaintiffs breached the warranty deed when they conveyed Rossi Hills with 
the encumbrances and title defects; that Doms was subsequently excused from performance 
regarding the entire transaction because of the Plaintiffs' breach of the warranty deed and, 
therefore, Doms was not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. Doms also asserts 
that the Plaintiffs could not foreclose because they came to a court of equity with "unclean 
hands." Doms' claims on this issue again ignore findings of fact made by the trial court and 
case law and therefore should be rejected. 
The trial court found that the warranty deed had been executed by all four plaintiffs as 
grantors. The court also found that earnest money agreements which preceded the warranty 
deed and were subsequently merged into it were signed by only some of the parties. (R. 6877, 
6885) In holding that the transactions were separate transactions, the trial court concluded: 
6. The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust 
Deed prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract. 
7. The Court believes that the law applicable to this 
case is: The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the 
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contract, and the Deed become (sic) final and conclusive evidence 
of the contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009). 
8. The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese 
Howell Company v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), 
set forth the controlling law which must be applied in the instant 
case regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, 
Note and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract. 
9. The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed 
at the same time does not make them part of the contract to 
purchase the contract. The Trust Deed and Note are documents 
executed to secure the payment of the property and have no 
bearing upon whether the property is free and clear of 
encumbrances. 
(R. 6890) 
The negotiations over the purchase of Rossi Hills culminated in a warranty deed executed 
by the four plaintiffs in favor of both Doms and McCoy. (Exhibit 1) Mrs. Ellen Anderson signed 
the warranty deed individually because she was a joint tenant of an undivided one-half interest. 
Mrs. Scott signed the deed merely as a courtesy; she had no interest in the property. Financing 
of the balance was accomplished by a trust deed and trust deed note issued by Doms and McCoy 
which benefitted only two of the four grantors, Messrs. Anderson and Scott. Neither Mrs. 
Anderson nor Mrs. Scott benefitted under the trust deed and note. (Exhibits 2 & 3) The 
warranty deed, the trust deed and note could be considered as supplementing each other to define 
all parts of the real estate acquisition. However, contrary to Doms' claim, that the warranty 
deed and the trust deed and trust deed note constitute separate contracts. 
In his claims that the warranty deed, the trust deed, and the trust deed note all constitute 
a single contract, Doms cites cases and statutes which stand for the proposition that the legal 
debt or obligation secured by a trust deed is part of and inseparable from the trust deed. Doms, 
however, then misconstrues this body of law to mean that the trust deed and the warranty deed 
must be bound together. What Doms ignores is that it is the trust deed note, and not the 
warranty deed, which is the legal debt secured by the trust deed. The trust deed note, not the 
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warranty deed, is the inseparable companion of the trust deed. If the trust deed and the trust 
deed note are considered one transaction, as the trial court held, the requirements of all of the 
cases cited by Doms on this issue are met and the tortured interpretation set forth by Doms can 
be discarded. The correct interpretation thus leaves the trust deed and trust deed note as one 
contract and the warranty deed as another, separate contract, as the trial court held. 
In Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the criteria that should be used to determine when two or more contemporaneously 
executed instruments should be construed together. The court stated, "[WJhere two or more 
instruments are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the 
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will be read and 
construed together . . . ." 501 P.2d at 271 (emphasis added). In the present case the criteria 
were not met because the parties executing the warranty deed and the trust deed and note are 
not the same parties and the instruments do not concern the same subject matter. The four-party 
warranty deed transferred the real estate to Doms and McCoy. The trust deed and trust deed 
note relate to the financing of a part of the purchase price and were executed by and benefited 
only two of the parties who executed the warranty deed. 
This case is no different than one where a trust deed and trust deed note were made 
payable to a bank. The bank's right in the trust deed would not be affected by problems 
involving the warranty deed and neither should the two parties who financed this operation be 
involved with problems relating to the granting of the warranty deed which involved additional 
parties who were not parties to the financing arrangement. 
A. Doms Was In Default Under the Trust Deed and the Trust Deed Note. (Doms Point II-C) 
Doms claims that he was excused from performance under the trust deed and the trust 
deed note. This argument depends on Doms' incorrect claim that all the documents were one 
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contract rather than two as held by the trial court. Doms again fails to perceive the difference 
between an executory and an executed contract. 
One of the contracts in this case is the warranty deed. Plaintiffs thought they were 
issuing a special warranty deed and titled the deed as such. In that case no breach of any 
covenants would have occurred. However, the trial court determined that the deed was a general 
warranty deed. Plaintiffs do not dispute that finding but nevertheless, the cause of action in 
Doms arises by reason of the covenant against encumbrances in the warranty deed. A violation 
of the covenant could give rise to damages unless such action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. However, because the warranty deed was a separate contract, breach of that contract 
would not excuse performance under the separate and distinct trust deed/trust deed note. Doms 
and McCoy failed to pay the note in accordance with its terms and this constituted a separate 
breach. Even if the court determined that Doms was excused from payment, Doms also failed 
to pay the taxes and this constituted yet another breach by Doms which is not excused. Failure 
to pay the taxes was a continuing default under the provisions of the trust deed and resulted in 
the sale of the property to Summit County. Both Doms and McCoy were in continuous, 
unexcused default for several years. 
Doms alleges that failure of consideration is a complete defense and relieves the 
nonbreaching party from performance. But in this case Doms and McCoy received a deed 
which was the full consideration. Further, the trial court found, based on the evidence, that 
Doms knew the properties were subject to certain encumbrances and rights of way before he 
consummated the transaction. The status of the property was known to Doms, who got what 
he paid for, and there is no failure of consideration. 
Doms cites Sprague v. Bovles Brothers Drilling Co., 294 P.2d 689 (Utah 1956) and 5 
Williston on Contracts §1303 to support his claim that he is excused from performance because 
21 
of the existence of the easement. However, Sprague and Williston both relate to executory 
contracts, not executed contracts. This is not a case where the four grantors were receiving 
payment from Doms under a contract to convey the property. To the contrary, the grantors had 
conveyed the property to Doms and were not entitled to any further consideration for the transfer 
of the property. Two of the parties had financed a portion of the sales price, but the amounts 
due under that contract are entirely separate from the amounts involved in the purchase contract. 
B. Anderson and Scott Cannot Be Denied the Right to Foreclose by Application of the Doctrine 
of Unclean Hands. (Doms' Point II-D) 
Doms asserts that Plaintiffs are not entitled to foreclosure because they came to court 
with "unclean hands" resulting from alleged misrepresentations made by them. As stated in 
Point IF, above, the trial court specifically held that Doms had presented insufficient evidence 
to substantiate his allegations concerning any alleged misrepresentations. Additionally, Doms 
knew the truth of all the alleged misrepresentations before he entered into the transaction. Only 
Doms and McCoy breached the financing contract. 
C. The Doctrine of Setoff Does Not Apply in This Case. (Doms Point II E) 
Finally, if the court accepts Doms' tortured analysis of this issue, he asks that the court 
remand for entry of a judgment which would include certain set-offs. Doms fails to 
acknowledge that cross-demands do not and cannot exist between the parties in this case. 
The parties to one part of the case (the violation of the covenant of the warranty deed) 
are not the same parties in the other part of the case (the trust deed foreclosure). Since different 
parties were involved in the sale and the financing, it would become necessary to allocate the 
liability of those not involved in the financing and somehow determine what amount of setoff 
can be applied in relation to each party. This result certainly was not contemplated and does 
not fall under the purview of Rule 13(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Further, if the court considered that cross demands did exist between Doms and McCoy 
on one hand and two of the four signers of the deed, then the Estate of D. C. Anderson must 
still be excused because no claim was filed against the estate. Only Mr. Scott would remain to 
share in the liability and he would have no enforceable claim against the co-grantors. This is 
obviously a ludicrous result. 
D. Doms Has No Right to Prejudgment Interest. (Doms' Point II-E) 
Even if the court were to sustain Doms' judgment, an award of prejudgment interest 
would be inappropriate. On the issue of prejudgment interest, Doms cites Biork v. April 
Industries. Inc.. 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977). In Biork the court stated, "Where the trier of fact 
has to determine the damage prejudgment interest is not allowed." The court further stated that 
"where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy . . . 
prejudgement interest is not allowed." 560 P.2d at 317. 
In this case conflicting evidence regarding the value of the real estate was presented. In 
fact, after hearing the evidence, the district court stated "So what it comes down, I wind up 
being the appraiser..." (R. 8282) The final figure was certainly not a loss that could be 
measured with mathematical accuracy. Therefore, prejudgment interest should not be awarded. 
POINT III 
DOMS WAS ENTITLED TO NO DAMAGES AND, IN ANY 
EVENT, HE IS ENTITLED TO NO MORE THAN THAT 
AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
(Doms' Point III) 
Doms' brief continually refers to the damages that arose as a result of "plaintiffs' 
misrepresentations." Doms was not awarded damages for any misrepresentations by Plaintiffs. 
The only damages received by Doms resulted from the court's determination that the word 
"special" on the warranty deed did not make it a special warranty and therefore, the document 
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contained a covenant against encumbrances. Plaintiffs, for the purpose of this appeal, concede 
that there were not enough "magical words" included in the special warranty deed to convert it 
from a general warranty. 
A. Doms Has No Right to Damages. 
Doms also claims that he should be awarded additional damages including prejudgment 
interest. Doms has sold the property and received full consideration. At trial an appraiser 
testified that the value of the property was same at the time that Doms transferred it to the 
corporation as when it was sold to Doms and McCoy. (R. 7938, 8174, 8194) Therefore, Doms 
is not entitled to any damages because this would be a double recovery. Doms would then have 
sold the land for consideration which he deemed appropriate and recover for a claimed breach 
in the covenant against encumbrances in the deed which vested in Doms only a one-half interest 
in the property. (Exhibit 16) 
Doms' argument also ignores the fact that he conveyed away his cause of action. A new 
cause of action could only arise if the corporation sued Doms. Doms' third cause of action 
based on fraud and misrepresentation was decided against him. (R. 7763,4) Doms withdrew his 
claim for loss of profits, his second cause of action. (R. 7928) As a result, by Doms' own 
actions and elections, he had abandoned all claims for damages. 
B. Doms Is Not Entitled to Damages as He Knew of the Easement Before Purchase, 
Accepted the Property and Valuations Are Incorrectly Based. 
The court must also determine whether Doms is entitled to damages because of the 
existence of encumbrances of which he was aware at the time he purchased the property. Doms 
knew of the existence of the claimed encumbrances prior to purchasing the property. Therefore, 
the best evidence of the value of the real estate with the encumbrances is the amount that Doms 
and McCoy paid for the property. Doms' own expert admitted that the fair market value of the 
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property with the encumbrances was the purchase price paid when the buyer was aware of the 
encumbrances. (R. 7882) 
In Jones v. Grow Investment Co., 358 P.2d 909 (Utah 1961), the court stated, "The 
seller is liable for the diminution of value if a general warranty deed is executed." This case 
is contrary to the majority position and is logically only valid in relation to encumbrances 
involving fixed amounts such as mortgages, etc. The best recent cases hold that apparent, 
irremovable easements are not covered by-the warranty against encumbrances if they are known 
to the purchaser. Judge Orme in his dissent in Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), stated that irremediable, open, apparent encumbrances should not fall 
within the purview of the covenant. 
Here, Doms not only knew of the easement, but planned to use it for the development 
of the property. Doms' expert testified that the fair market value of the property, with the 
easements and encumbrances in place, would be the amount of $276,000.00 at the date it was 
sold to Doms and McCoy. The trial court held that the easement had a beneficial value but 
attached no specific monetary amount to such value. (R. 6889) No evidence was adduced to 
indicate what the value of the property would have been on the date of the sale to Doms and 
McCoy if the encumbrances were not in place. Therefore, the trial court's determination of 
damages for Doms was entirely speculative. Furthermore, Doms owned only an undivided one-
half interest in the property (Exhibit 1) and therefore, Doms could not logically be entitled to 
the total damages incurred because of a breach of the covenant against encumbrances. At most, 
Doms would be entitled to only one-half of any monetary damages assessed due to a breach of 
covenant against encumbrances. 
The trial court found that testimony from different appraisers at trial adduced different 
values for the property. (R. 6881) The court found that Plaintiffs' appraiser placed the value 
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of the property at $250,000 on March 10,1982, while Doms' appraiser stated that the property 
was worth $166,000 if the encumbrances could be relocated and $110,000 if they could not. 
The court also concluded that one of the encumbrances, the loop road has "beneficial value for 
the development" of the property. (R. 6891) However, the court made no finding regarding its 
valuation of the property. The court only concluded that Doms had suffered damages in the 
amount of $83,000. (R. 6891) No basis for the court's determination of damages appears in the 
findings and conclusions. 
The property was sold on the basis that its highest and best use would be as part of an 
integrated development with two adjoining parcels. For example, Sloan, the real estate agent, 
testified that he did not ever suggest that the Rossi Hills property could be developed as "a stand 
alone parcel" and that he "felt without question that the best development for that parcel was in 
tandem with the other two parcels, without question." (R. 7686-7) Doms adduced no evidence 
indicating the value of the property, with encumbrances, as a part of a three-party development. 
Only this would be the correct measure of damages, all of Doms' damage evidence treated the 
property as a stand-alone parcel with various prospective lot descriptions and developments.5 
5
 The appraisers who testified differed on the number of units that could be located on 
the property, title methodology for development, the value of the units and the price for the 
units if they had been constructed. No evidence related to lot values based on a replatting of 
the property. All of the evidence in relation to difference in value is completely speculative 
and not based on the prime concern at the time of the sale which was the value of the 
property as a part of a three-party development. 
Further errors are apparent in relation to damages. Plaintiffs conveyed by lot 
designation and statutes furnished the court indicated that the lot designation transferred the 
property to the center of the road that bounded the property. Doms conceded that his 
appraiser did not take into account the use of the undeveloped portion of McHenry Avenue. 
McHenry Avenue had been vacated by the mere passage of time. Therefore, Doms' entire 
appraisal was faulty. Further, it was established that the encumbrances could be relocated on 
appropriate request (R. 2616, 17) even the third party claiming an easement testified that she 
had an easement over plaintiffs' property and she would consider relocation of the easement. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that damages in a case such as this cannot be 
determined by dividing property into building lots and then speculating as to price. For 
example, in State v. Tedesco. 291 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1956), the court stated: 
"The jury are to value the tract of land and that only. They 
are not to determine how it could best be divided into building lots 
nor conjecture how fast they could be sold, nor at what price per 
lot. . . . They are not to inquire what a speculator might be able 
to realize out of the resale in the future, but what a present 
purchaser would be willing to pay for it in the condition it is now 
in." 
quoting Penn.S.V.R. Co. v. Clearv. 17 A. 468 (Pa. 1889) In Utah Road Comn. v. Hansen. 383 
P.2d 917, 920 (Utah 1963), the Court stated: "The valuation must be on the basis of what a 
willing purchaser would pay now and not what a number of purchasers might be induced to pay 
in the future for the land in smaller parcels." In Thorsen v. Johnson. 796 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990), this court stated, "It is proper to inquire what the tract is worth, having in view 
the purposes for which it was best adapted, but it is the tract, not the lots into which it might 
be divided that is to be valued." 
Domcoy Enterprises failed in its attempt to develop the integrated development. Since 
this was the primary basis for the sale of the property, Plaintiffs should not be assessed for the 
failure to develop an integrated development, particularly when, as the trial court found, Doms 
knew before the sale that prior efforts at an integrated development had failed. (R. 6882) 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling on the Issue of Doms' Damages Due to the Easements and 
Encumbrances Was Within the Scope of the Testimony of Doms' Real Estate Appraiser. (Doms 
Point IIIC) 
In Point IIIC of his brief, Doms states that no competent evidence supported the trial 
court's ruling that $83,000 constituted the proper measure of damages for the breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances. Doms states that the trial court's ruling should be reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Generally, the appellate court will presume that the 
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discretion of the trial court has been properly exercised unless the record clearly demonstrates 
otherwise. Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987). 
Obviously, in making the evaluation of the trial court's proper use of its discretion, the 
reviewing court may consider all the factors used by the trial court in reaching its decision. 
Doms has omitted either reference to the following evidence which supports the trial 
court's rulings, or a showing of why this evidence is insufficient to support the court's ruling. 
1. Doms' appraiser,Webber, admitted $276,000 could be the fair market value of 
the Rossi Hills property, even with all the easements and encumbrances in place, if a person 
offered to pay that much for it after having viewed the easements and encumbrances. (R. 7882). 
After knowing about them, Doms made an offer to purchase the property for $276,000. Under 
these circumstances, the court would have been justified in finding that $276,000 was a fair 
value for the property even if the easements or encumbrances were never moved and therefore 
there would be no damages. 
2. Plaintiffs' appraiser, Pia, used eight comparable sales within a mile of Rossi Hills 
to reach his conclusion on value of the property. (R. 8173) He testified the fair-market value of 
Rossi Hills on March 10, 1982, without the encumbrances was $275,000 (R. 8173-8174) and 
with the encumbrances between $240,000-250,000. (R. 8174) Webber admitted the method used 
by Pia in determining fair-market value was "an appropriate measure." (R. 8198-8199). 
3. Webber admitted his entire appraisal report was based on the fact that McHenry 
Avenue could be used as a means of access to the Rossi Hills property. (R. 7900). However, 
he also admitted that Park City ordinances would not allow McHenry Avenue to be developed 
as a road because it exceeded the requirements permitted by the Park City ordinances. (R. 
7900). Plaintiffs' appraiser, Pia, testified he talked to the Park City Engineer, who told him 
McHenry Avenue could not be developed as a public road because it exceeded the slope 
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requirements (R. 8177-8178) and the law had vacated McHenry Avenue. 
4. Exhibit 99-P, a certified copy of a 1911 plat of a Park City Survey, was used to 
establish that McHenry Avenue was platted as a public way but had not been used for over five 
years. (R. 8125). Under such circumstances, the abutting property owners would be entitled 
to one-half of McHenry Avenue. North Temple Investment Corporation v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation. 489 P.2d 106 (Utah 1971). Exhibit 98-P showed a development of the Rossi Hills 
property using this one-half of McHenry Avenue as part of the development. Pia used the 
exhibit and appraiser Deckert's analysis to determine the fair market value of the Rossi Hills 
property with and without the encumbrances. (R. 8177). 
5. Webber's methodology for determining the fair market value of Rossi Hills, which 
consisted of raw ground, was to determine the number of units which could be placed on the 
property, without any easements or encumbrances, and then relate those units to a hypothetical 
single-family dwelling. Webber then investigated comparable sales and determined a per-unit 
market value to apply to the Rossi Hill development. Such methodology has been expressly 
disapproved by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Tedesco. 291 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1956). 
6. Webber testified that if a developer could not use McHenry Avenue, an access 
road would be required which would cut the number of units to be placed on the property from 
ten to six. (R. 7906-7907) With six units, Webber estimated the fair market value would be 
$166,000. 
7. Webber admitted Rossi Hills could not be profitably developed even if no 
easements such as a loop road and/or encumbrances such as the fences and sheds existed because 
the building costs would be prohibitive. (R. 7925). At this point in the trial, Doms' counsel 
withdrew the second cause of action for the loss of profits. (R. 7927-7928). 
8. Webber acknowledged a reasonable buyer would take into consideration the Land-
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Management Code and the later Master Plan in buying the Rossi Hills property because Park 
City was planning to adopt a Master-Plan Development ("MPD") which would allow the 
clustering of improvements which would increase the fair market value of the property. Webber 
testified that buyers were purchasing property in anticipation of the probable adoption of that 
Master Plan. (R. 7941). 
9. McHenry Avenue had never been used as a public road. Under the law in effect 
at the time, nonuse of a public road for a period of five years means that it is abandoned. 
Revised Stat, of Utah §1116 (1898). Plaintiffs moved to strike Webber's testimony and his 
appraisal report on the grounds that McHenry Avenue had long been abandoned as a public 
right-of-way and Webber's testimony and report were based solely on the existence of McHenry 
Avenue as a public roadway. (R. 7976-7978) The court acknowledged the nonuse of McHenry 
Avenue for the statutory period would allow abandonment or vacation of the road and that 
McHenry Avenue was not feasible as a roadway. (R. 8122, 8127-28) However, the court did 
not strike Webber's testimony. 
10. Webber admitted he did not appraise the value of the property at the time Doms 
and McCoy deeded it to Domcoy in August of 1983. (R. 7938) The only testimony on this issue 
came from the Plaintiffs' appraiser, who testified the fair market value at the time Doms and 
McCoy conveyed their interest to Domcoy was approximately the same it had been when Doms 
purchased it from the Plaintiffs in March 1982. (R. 8194) 
11. Webber testified a Park City Hillside ordinance in 1982 prohibited building on a 
slope greater than 30% in an HR-1 zone. (R. 7900, R. 8201) However, Plaintiffs' land use 
planner, Steve Deckert, testified no such ordinance was in effect. (R. 8078) Webber admitted 
he had made a mistake on this point. (R. 8199-8200) It was unclear whether Webber's 
appraisal was based on this faulty premise. Webber's testimony was based on false premises in 
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that the parties did own to the center of McHenry Avenue and the location of the easement could 
be varied. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Admitted Evidence from Plaintiffs' Appraiser Because Doms' 
Counsel Was Given Ample Opportunity to Review the Expert's Documents and Depose Him. 
(Doms' Point HID) 
In Point HID of his brief, Doms alleges the trial judge committed prejudicial error by 
allowing Plaintiffs' expert, land use planner Steve Deckert, to testify with respect to Exhibit 98P 
and that the exhibit should have been excluded as a sanction for violation of discovery rules. 
After Doms' counsel made this objection at trial, the trial judge took an immediate recess to 
allow counsel to review the exhibit. (R. 8062) In overruling Doms' objections and admitting 
exhibit 98-P, the court stated the exhibit represented the same piece of property which Doms 
purchased and, therefore, it was relevant. (R. 8060) The exhibit was prepared by the witness 
and the other exhibit used by Deckert, exhibit 97-P, was admitted without objection. 
Doms next argues in his Point HID that all the testimony of Plaintiffs' real estate 
appraiser, Pia, as well as Mr. Pia's appraisal documents, should have been excluded as a 
sanction against Plaintiffs for violating discovery rules. When Doms' counsel raised this issue, 
the trial judge recessed the trial to give Mr. Keller and his appraiser time to review the matter 
for trial the next day. (R. 8141,2.) Further, Doms declined the invitation to take Mr. Pia's 
deposition. (R. 8169) 
The admission or exclusion of evidence is in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Utah 1989). Furthermore, Rule 61 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that an error in the admission of evidence is not a basis for 
reversal unless the trial court's error in admitting the evidence affect the "substantial rights of 
the parties." In this case, Doms has not demonstrated how his substantial rights were affected 
by the admission of the evidence. Furthermore, Doms has ignored the following relevant 
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evidence which demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
evidence. 
In April 1990, Plaintiffs' counsel had informed Doms' counsel of Plaintiffs' intention to 
call Pia as an expert witness on the issue of damages. (R. 8169) Consequently, Doms' counsel 
had more than four months to take Pia's deposition prior to at trial. Pia testified about a 
telephone call from Doms' counsel on or about April 20, 1990, in which Doms' counsel inquired 
about his appraisal, but did not ask anything about his appraisal notes. (R. 8263) At this time, 
he answered all questions truthfully. (R. 8263) Pia testified about being told Doms' counsel 
wanted to take his deposition and later being told his deposition had been cancelled. (R. 8262) 
He identified exhibit 101-P, introduced without objection, as a letter dealing with the deposition. 
(R. 8262) 
In a discussion between the court and counsel, plaintiffs' counsel represented that Doms' 
counsel had contacted Plaintiffs' counsel in the preceding two months to schedule Pia's 
deposition. Plaintiffs' counsel set a time to take Pia's deposition in Doms' attorney's office. 
Plaintiffs' counsel informed Doms' counsel that he would be allowed access to all information 
Pia had at the time of the deposition. Two days before the deposition, in a letter to Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Doms' counsel stated that because a request had been made for Doms to pay part of 
the expert witness fee pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for having 
Pia attend the deposition, Doms' counsel "didn't want to run his client's costs up any more, so 
he was going to cancel the deposition." (R. 8169) Counsel also represented to the court at the 
same time that the reason Plaintiffs did not ask for a full appraisal report was because it was 
costly to the clients and a letter summary supported by Pia's field notes would be sufficient. 
(R. 8168-69) 
When counsel made his first objections, the court immediately recessed for the rest of 
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the day to give Doms' counsel a chance to review the appraisal documents and review them with 
Doms' expert appraiser. (R. 8140-43) When the court made this gesture, Doms' counsel 
requested Pia testify without any overnight recess. However, the court said it would allow the 
recess to let counsel and the expert review the appraisal documents. (R. 8142) 
These circumstances demonstrate that Doms' counsel had more than four months to take 
Pia's deposition and discover any and all information in his file. In fact, a deposition was 
scheduled but cancelled by Doms when Plaintiffs' counsel insisted on Doms' paying a certain 
portion of Mr. Pia's expert witness fees for attending the deposition pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4). 
Finally, the court recessed immediately and allowed Doms' counsel and his expert appraiser to 
review Pia's appraisal memorandum to prepare for cross-examination. 
Doms cites no case from this jurisdiction, or any other jurisdiction for that matter, which 
supports his contention that Pia's testimony and report should have been stricken as a violation 
of the discovery process. In fact, the case law is contrary to Doms' position. In Berrett v. 
Denver and Rio Grande Western RR Co.. 830 P.2d 291,296 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this court 
held that "absent an order creating a judicially imposed deadline, a trial court may not sanction 
a party by excluding its witnesses under Rule 37(b)(2)." The record in this case contains no 
judicially imposed discovery deadline. Therefore, the trial court would have committed 
reversible error if it had excluded Pia's testimony. 
Furthermore, the trial court is given broad discretion in the admission of evidence. The 
court in this case determined that Pia's testimony and report would be admissible if Doms 
attorney were given time to inspect it. The continuance granted by the trial court was a 
sufficient remedy to rectify any discovery violation which may have occurred. Pia's testimony, 
as well as his appraisal documents, were properly admitted. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DOMS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE OF D. C. 
ANDERSON WAS TIME-BARRED BY THE PROBATE NON-
CLAIM STATUTE. 
(Doms' Point IV) 
Utah Code Ann. §§75-3-801 and -803 (1978), provided that a "claim" against the 
decedent's estate must be filed within three months after the date of the first publication of notice 
to creditors. The trial court relied on §75-3-803 and a finding that Doms had not filed his claim 
within the prescribed period to hold that Doms' second amended counterclaim against the Estate 
of D. C. Anderson, as the claim relates to remedy of damages, was time barred by the three-
month limitations period. (R. 6884) 
In his brief, Doms asserts that his counterclaim was an equitable action that did not fall 
within the definition of a "claim." He also argues that even if the claim was barred by the non-
claim statute, he was entitled to a setoff against the purchase price. Doms' contention 
concerning setoff is addressed elsewhere in this brief. See Reply Point VIII infra. 
With respect to Doms' assertion that his action for rescission does not fall within the 
definition of "claim," Doms ignores the facts of this case and reads the case law too broadly. 
Doms first asserts that his action for rescission against the estate was not time-barred. This 
argument is essentially moot because the trial court, as previously noted, found that Doms was 
not entitled to rescission. Therefore, regardless of whether the trial court was correct in barring 
Doms' claim because of the non-claim statute, Doms cannot prevail on this issue if this court 
upholds the trial court's findings and holdings concerning rescission. 
Doms also makes the assertion that prior cases from the Utah appellate courts have held 
that "an equitable action against the estate is not a claim within the meaning" of the non-claim 
statute. This interpretation reads too much into the cases Doms cites in support. The primary 
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case on which Doms relies in support of his wayward proposition is In Re: Estate of Sharp, 537 
P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975). In Sharp, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the term 'claim' . . . does 
not include a claim for specific performance, but refers to demands against the decedent which 
might have been enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions for the recovery of money; and 
upon which only a money judgment could have been rendered." 537 P.2d at 1037. While the 
Sharp Court does cite a California case which held that "purely equitable" actions did not fall 
within the terms of the non-claim statute, nothing in Sharp, or any other case decided since 
Sharp, can be read to include any equitable claims other than specific performance in the court's 
interpretation. See also Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 77 (Utah 1982); In Re: Estate of 
Sheplev. 645 P.2d 605, 606-07 (Utah 1982). 
However, even if such a limitation exists, for the "claim" to fall outside the non-claim 
statute, it must be one for which only equitable relief can be obtained. Sharp. 537 P.2d at 1037. 
In this case, the trial court ruled that Doms is not entitled to any equitable relief and that the 
only relief to which he was entitled was monetary relief and therefore, any proscription 
enunciated in Sharp is not applicable here. The trial court then held that any monetary relief 
which could be afforded Doms had been foreclosed by his failure to meet the requirements of 
the non-claim statute. 
Furthermore, Doms' original claim was not one which could be considered "purely 
equitable." Damages which arise by way of a breach of contract are payable in money which 
clearly brings such action under the purview of the non-claim statute. Furthermore, in order to 
successfully assert rescission, Doms would have had to have claimed a violation of a contract 
to convey the property, which simply could not be asserted in this case. Additionally, in order 
for Doms to make a claim for rescission, he must tender the property, but Doms did not 
reacquire the property until substantially after he had commenced his counterclaim. Therefore, 
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at the time of the initiation of this action, when Doms did not own the property, his action could 
not have been considered one which was "purely equitable." Even if the court could consider 
that Doms had made a valid tender of the property after he reacquired it, which was never done, 
the court must also note the fact that Doms only reacquired an undivided on-half interest in the 
property and therefore could not make a proper demand for rescission because he could not 
place Plaintiffs in the same position which they occupied before the transaction. 
Finally, the court should consider the policies and purposes behind the non-claim statute. 
In Dementas v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this court stated that 
the preface to the code "provides that 'the Code shall be liberally construed and applied to 
promote its underlying purposes and policies,' which include '[t]o discover and make effective 
the interest of a decedent and distribution of his property . . . . ' " quoting Utah Code Ann. §75-
1-102(1), (2)(b)(1978). The requirements of the nonclaim statute are not difficult to fulfill; all 
that is really required is that the estate have notice of a claim within a certain period. Ouinn 
v. Ouinn. 772 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The short limitation period is to allow an 
estate to be probated as quickly and as conveniently as possible. 
In this case, D. C. Anderson died in 1982. Doms waited over 5Vi years until 1988 to 
file anything resembling a claim against the estate. In fact, after the foreclosure action was 
initially filed by Plaintiffs, including the estate of D. C. Anderson, in 1985, Doms made no 
response and filed nothing with the personal representative of the estate to put her on notice of 
any potential claim. Doms' assertion now that his counterclaim did not rise to the level of a 
"claim" as required by the statute is nothing more than a subterfuge to circumvent the purposes 
and policies of the non-claim statute. The trial court held as much when it barred Doms' claim 
against the estate. With the exception discussed in Point VIII of the reply portion of this brief 
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below, the trial court should be upheld on this issue.6 
POINT V 
DOMS IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS FOR SUSTAINING HIS TITLE TO ROSSI 
HILLS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS' FORECLOSURE AND QUIET 
TITLE ACTIONS BECAUSE THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS 
FOR SUCH AN AWARD AND BECAUSE THIS ISSUE IS 
BEING RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL . 
(Doms Point V) 
In his brief Doms argues that the Plaintiffs have assailed and disputed Doms' title to 
Rossi Hills in both the main action (Civil No. 8339) and the quiet title action in the tax-sale case 
(Civil No. 10066). Doms therefore asserts that he is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred 
in sustaining his title to Rossi Hills against these actions. This court should refuse to address 
Doms' argument because it is raised for the first time on this appeal. If the court chooses to 
address the issue, Doms' claim should be rejected because he is not entitled to attorney fees. 
This is the first time Doms has ever claimed he is entitled to attorney fees because the 
Plaintiffs have assailed and disputed his title. In his "Trial Brief Regarding Issues of 
Prejudgment Interest and Attorney Fees" dated January 4, 1991, Doms requested attorney fees 
for three different reasons: (1) as "consequential damages" resulting from Plaintiffs' breach of 
contract, (2) as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of the earnest money agreement, and (3) because 
Plaintiffs had brought "meritless claims" and asserted defenses in bad faith. (Doms' Brief, Point 
6
 As previously indicated in this brief, setoff is not applicable in this case because all of 
the parties are not identical in each transaction. Further, assuming that the court can 
somehow rationalize the damage award, that award cannot be set off as against the original 
contract price. It can only claimed as a credit against any amount that Doms might owe the 
estate of D. C. Anderson or Mr. Scott. Obviously, it cannot be used as a credit against any 
amounts owed to Mrs. Anderson as an individual and Mrs. Scott as an individual, because 
Doms does not owe anything to either of them. An attempt to develop some formula for the 
application of the various judgments is an entirely different lawsuit. Any judgments rendered 
in favor of either party must be left to those parties' own devices to satisfy. 
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V) Nowhere in the trial brief does Doms claim he is entitled to attorney fees for having to 
defend any attack on his "title" to the Rossi Hills property. This court cannot consider an 
argument which is made for the first time on appeal. Wurst v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 818 
P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("It is well-settled that this court will not address an 
issue raised for the first time on appeal.") 
A. Doms' "Title" Was Not Attacked. 
Further, the facts in this case do not support Doms' claims. Nothing in the foreclosure 
action in the main case (Civil No. 8339) attacks Doms' title. The foreclosure action was 
brought simply to foreclose on the a trust deed and a trust deed note which Doms and McCoy 
had signed. Doms second amended counterclaim is based solely on a breach of the covenant and 
warranties against easements and encumbrances. Nothing is claimed with respect to a breach of 
a covenant of "warranty" or "quiet enjoyment" or any other warranty or covenant other than 
"easements and encumbrances." Consequently, Forrer v. Sather. 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), 
cited by Doms in support of his contention that he should have received attorney fees is 
inapposite because that case specifically concerned breach of the covenant of warranty. Nothing 
in any of the motions, memoranda, or other documents filed by Doms in the trial court ever 
asserted a claim for breach of the covenant of "warranty" or "quiet enjoyment." 
Doms never requested the trial judge determine the "title" issue in the main case. Doms 
did not try to establish the property owners along Ontario Avenue had "title" to any part of his 
property by virtue of boundary line by acquiescence, adverse possession, or any other legal 
theory. His sole claim with respect to any "easement" or "encumbrance" was made on the basis 
that the alleged sheds, fences, and loop road had been in existence for more than twenty years 
and, therefore, constituted "prescriptive easements." He had never argued these same fences, 
sheds, or loop road destroyed Doms' "title" to the Rossi Hills property. 
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The trial judge summarized Doms' argument as admitting that the property owners along 
Ontario Avenue did not acquire fee title, but merely "prescriptive easements." (R. 8025) The 
judge recognized the same principle later when he stated "you have use, but you don't get fee 
title. The other, by adverse possession, you get the fee title eventually." (R. 8026) The court 
later asked Doms' attorney "so the only issue here is whether or not the easement exists with 
a fee in the present entity," to which the attorney responded, "Right, obviously Your Honor 
understands the difference between having title to the property and the title remaining in the 
owner of the property, but you have a right to use it. That's what a prescriptive easement is. 
Prescriptive means adverse use of another's property. You don't obtain title. You have the 
right to use the property." (R. 8032) Obviously, Doms made no claim made at trial that the 
property owners along Ontario Avenue had any "title" to the property. 
With respect to Doms' allegations that the tax-sale case (Civil No. 10066) assailed or 
disputed Doms' title to Rossi Hill, that is not accurate. Civil No. 10066 was commenced 
because both Doms and his successor, Domcoy, failed to pay the taxes due under the trust deed 
on Rossi Hills for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. (R. 00041) A tax sale was 
held on May 27, 1987, at which time no one bid on the property. The Summit County Auditor 
conveyed the property by an auditor's deed to Summit County. (R. 00043, 00046) This gave 
Summit County "fee simple" title to Rossi Hills. The auditor's deed also extinguished all prior 
titles and encumbrances of private persons and all equities arising out of them, including the 
Plaintiffs' trust deed. See Hanson v. Burris. 46 P.2d 400, 406 (Utah 1935). Had the tax sale 
not been set aside, the Plaintiffs' trust deed would have been extinguished by operation of law. 
This made Civil No. 10066 necessary. 
Consequently, no basis exists for Doms' statement that Plaintiffs have attacked his "title" 
to the property, and he is raising this point for the first time on appeal. In Espinoza v. Safeco 
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Title Insurance company, 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979), the court clearly noted the law which has 
existed in Utah for over 70 years: 
It has long been the law of this State that reasonable attorney's 
fees are recoverable as damages against the grantor of a warranty 
deed when those fees are incurred by the grantee in defending title 
and where the grantor has had notice of the pending action and has 
refused to defend. But no attorney fees are allowable against the 
grantor which are incurred in the action to recover such damages 
against said grantor. 
598 P.2d at 348 (emphasis added). In other words, a grantee may not recover attorney fees 
against the grantor in the grantee's action for a breach of the covenant against encumbrances, 
especially when the grantee has not paid anything to either purchase or extinguish the 
encumbrances and thus, has not been damaged. Even Forrer v. Sather. 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 
1979), cited by Doms, supports this general principle. 
Since Doms never paid anything to the property owners on Ontario Avenue to remove 
their loop road, sheds, fences, etc., and since he did not start any separate action to "quiet title" 
to these alleged title deficiencies, there is no basis for Doms to be awarded fees. He has no 
contract authorizing him to be awarded fees, and there is no statute in Utah which allows fees. 
B. Doms Is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees as Consequential Damages Due to 
Plaintiffs' Breach of the Covenants. (Doms' Point VB) 
In Point VB of his brief, Doms argues he is entitled to attorney fees as consequential 
damages flowing from Plaintiffs' breach of contract. Doms bases this claim on Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
Canyon Country Store concerned a claim by an insured of bad faith against his insurance 
company. The court noted "Utah adheres to the well-established rule that attorney fees generally 
cannot be recovered unless provided for by statute or contract." 781 P.2d at 419. The court 
also recognized that attorney fees could be awarded as consequential damages in a breach of 
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contract action. 781 P.2d at 420. However, in such an instance the court stated that attorney 
fees recoverable as damages must be based on the party's actual losses. Id. In a recent opinion, 
the court of appeals has interpreted Canyon Country Store to apply only to insurance contracts. 
Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982, 984-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In Collier, the court also held 
that only fees actually incurred in "litigation with the third party are recoverable as consequential 
damages." 827 P.2d at 984. A party would not be entitled to attorney fees under the third-party 
exception unless he had been required to engage in a separate litigation. 
Had Doms commenced legal action against the property owners abutting on Ontario 
Avenue to remove their loop road, fences and sheds, or had he commenced an action to "quiet 
title" to the Rossi Hills property, he may have been entitled to attorney fees under the third-party 
exception. But Doms has not engaged in separate litigation against the other property owners. 
Therefore, he is not entitled to attorney fees. 
C. Doms Is Not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on any Award of Attorney Fees. (Doms' Point 
VC) 
In Point VC of his brief, Doms argues he is entitled to prejudgment interest on an award 
of attorney fees. This argument fails for two reasons. In the first place, Doms is not entitled 
to attorney fees because (1) there is no written contract allowing fees to Doms, (2) there is no 
statute allowing fees to Doms, and (3) Doms is not entitled to fees under the third party attorney 
fees exception. Even if Doms were entitled to attorney fees, prejudgment interest could not be 
awarded because any fees would have to be finally determined by the trial judge after an 
evidentiary hearing; they cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty. See Canyon Country 
Store. 781 P.2d at 422. 
D. Doms Is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal. (Doms' Point 
VD) 
In Point VD of his brief, Doms argues he is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred 
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on this appeal. Doms' argument presumes success on this appeal. Furthermore, no basis exists 
for Doms' claim for attorney fees in the trial court and, therefore, there is no basis for awarding 
Doms any attorney fees on appeal. 
E. The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Not Awarding Costs to Doms Who Was 
Not Entitled to an Award of Costs. (Doms' Point VE) 
In Point VE of his brief, Doms argues he is entitled to appropriate costs, including costs 
of depositions. The trial court ruled that Doms was entitled to costs in the amount of $101.50. 
(R. 6885-86) 
Doms is not entitled to any further award of costs because he is not the prevailing party 
on his second amended counterclaim. The first cause of action dealing with rescission in the 
counterclaim was dismissed by Judge Rokich after the first segment of the trial in April 1990. 
Doms withdrew his second cause of action dealing with loss of profits or profitability of the 
Rossi Hills development. (R. 7927-30). The trial court dismissed Doms' second cause of action 
based on the representations of counsel. (R. 7930) With respect to the third cause of action in 
Doms' second amended counterclaim, Doms' counsel admitted during the trial that he did not 
intend to call any further witnesses with respect to fraud and misrepresentation issues and invited 
the court to make a ruling against him on that issue. (R. 7763-64) The court responded that 
it did not find sufficient evidence to support the claim of fraud and misrepresentation. (R. 7763-
64). Nothing further exists in Doms' second amended counterclaim to support and award of 
costs. 
Deposition costs are clearly within the discretion of the trial judge and it does not appear 
that any of the depositions Doms took were utilized by Doms at the time of trial. Ames v. 
Maas, 846 P.2d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Finally Doms' request for costs regarding travel 
expenses and numerous other items in his memorandum of costs and disbursements were not 
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legitimate "costs" within the meaning of Rule 54(d) URCP. Cornish Town v. Roller. 817 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1991). 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ALL THE ATTORNEY 
FEES AWARDED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE PLUS AN 
ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF FEES FOR HAVING TO 
DEFEND AGAINST DOMS' STUBBORNLY LITIGIOUS 
CONDUCT. 
A. Doms Did Not Prevail on Any of His Counterclaims. 
In Point VI of his brief, Doms states that with the exception of two categories of attorney 
fees awarded by the trial judge, ". . . all of the attorney's fees and costs awarded to Plaintiffs 
by the trial court are based on the erroneous legal conclusion that Doms was in default under 
the trust deed and trust deed note." Doms apparently acknowledges that if this court affirms the 
trial court's ruling that Doms was in default under the trust deed and trust deed note, then, it 
necessarily follows the trial judge's award of the fees and costs is reasonable, necessary, and 
should be upheld. Doms was in default under the trust deed note and the trust deed and had not 
been excused from performance.7 
In the first cause of action in this counterclaim, Doms asked for rescission of the 
warranty deed, the trust deed note and the trust deed. Had Doms been successful on this cause 
of action, the trust deed and trust deed note would have been rescinded and the Plaintiffs' 
foreclosure action would have failed. Therefore, the defense to the counterclaim was absolutely 
necessary as part of the foreclosure action because without that defense, the foreclosure action 
would have been dismissed. 
7
 In Point XII their opening brief, Plaintiffs have set forth the reasons why they are 
entitled to the attorney fees awarded by the trial judge and substantial additional attorney 
fees. 
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Similarly, the Plaintiffs were required to defend against Doms' third cause of action 
which asked for rescission based on fraud and misrepresentation. A defense to this claim was 
necessary because if the claim had been successful and if rescission had been granted based upon 
fraud and misrepresentation, the trust deed and trust deed note would have been eliminated and 
Plaintiffs' foreclosure action would have been dismissed. The trial court ruled against Doms on 
this issue based on insufficient evidence. 
The only other cause of action in the counterclaim dealt with a loss-of-profits claim, 
because the Rossi Hills property could not be developed with the easements and encumbrances. 
Plaintiffs spent a great deal of time with expert witnesses to defend against this loss-of-profits 
claim. During counsel's cross-examination of Doms' appraiser, Doms' counsel withdrew the 
claim. (R. 7927-30) He also stated at another time he was not going to pursue or make any 
claim for "consequential damages." (R. 7971) 
Since Plaintiffs were successful in defending against all three causes of action stated in 
the counterclaim which would have eviscerated the trust deed and note, both of which contain 
provisions for the award of attorney fees, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing 
and successful parties. The trial court recognized Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs and 
expenses incurred in defending against those causes of action which Doms' counsel withdrew. 
The major category of Plaintiffs' requested fees which Judge Rokich disallowed were 
those pertaining to the Plaintiffs' successful defense to all three causes of action in Doms' second 
amended counterclaim. The court concluded the case of Stubbs v. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1977), established that a party is never entitled to any attorney fees for legal services 
rendered in connection with an opposing party's counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs submit Stubbs does not stand for the proposition that a party is never entitled 
to attorney fees with respect to a successful defense of a counterclaim. In Stubbs, the court held 
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the plaintiff was not entitled to fees for defending against a counterclaim because the plaintiff 
was not successful in defending against the counterclaim and because the counterclaim did not 
relate to the issues raised in the plaintiffs main complaint. 567 P.2d at 171. If these two factors 
had not been present, the Utah Supreme Court would have reached a different result in Stubbs. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), the court not only recognized the 
legal basis for, but actually awarded substantial attorney fees for all work done by the bank's 
attorneys in defending against an unsuccessful counterclaim. 
In this case, Plaintiffs were successful in defending against all three causes of action 
raised by Doms in his second amended counterclaim. Furthermore, the trial judge specifically 
held the facts, causes of action, and claims raised in the second amended counterclaim did relate 
to the plaintiffs' primary foreclosure complaint. Under these circumstances, all of the attorney 
fees incurred by Plaintiffs in defending against the second amended counterclaim are legitimate 
fees to be awarded to Plaintiffs. 
As pointed out in Point XII of Plaintiffs' opening brief, Dixie State Bank provides 
authority for an award to Plaintiffs of all attorney fees incurred in defending against Doms' 
unsuccessful second amended counterclaim. Doms has been stubbornly litigious in the instant 
case, just as the defendants were in Dixie State Bank. The best example of the "stubbornly 
litigious" stance taken by Doms in the instant case can be seen in the numerous, unfounded 
objections which Doms filed to legitimate discovery requests during the 1989 discovery period 
and the fact he withdrew or abandoned his second and third causes of action. (R. 7763 and 
7928,30) Doms objected to virtually all the requests for production of documents and requests 
for admissions submitted by Plaintiffs. Doms' counsel also directed him not to answer questions 
at his deposition and stonewalled any efforts to obtain answers to legitimate questions. Based 
on this hardened stance and stubborn refusal to comply with the liberal discovery rules, Judge 
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Frederick levied sanctions against Doms. (R. 01739) 
This case started out as a simple foreclosure matter involving only a trust deed and trust 
deed note. However, Doms' unsuccessful, unfounded, and meritless causes of action set forth 
in his second amended counterclaim, as well as his stubborn refusal to participate in the 
discovery process, turned the simple foreclosure action into a case where Doms' attorney admits 
he charged his client $150,000 in attorney fees, which his client paid, and which required the 
Plaintiffs to also incur substantial fees.8 
Because of Doms' actions Plaintiffs were obligated to commence a third-party complaint 
against SCTC in which they asked that SCTC indemnify them for any damages which Doms was 
entitled to under his counterclaim. The claim was upheld by the trial judge following a hearing 
8
 The basis for some of the additional fees is illustrated by the following example. 
After the second segment of the trial in August 1990, the court issued a memorandum 
decision dated October 4, 1990, in which the court found Doms was excused from 
performance and was not in default under the terms of the trust deed note and the trust deed. 
Thereafter, Doms' counsel prepared findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final 
judgment based on this memorandum decision. The Plaintiffs incurred substantial attorney 
fees to prepare objections to these findings, etc. Following a hearing in December 1990, the 
trial judge frankly admitted that he had made a mistake in his original oral findings. On 
February 12, 1991, the trial judge sent all counsel a letter to which he attached certain 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions which had been prepared by Doms' counsel. The 
court designated certain paragraphs which were to be omitted, including all those specifying 
Doms was excused from performance and was not in default. The court also told Doms' 
counsel to delete a conclusion that Doms was the prevailing party in Civil No. 8339 and to 
change another conclusion to show that Plaintiffs prevailed on their complaint to foreclose 
the trust deed and trust deed note and to delete previous language saying Plaintiffs had failed 
on the foreclosure action. The court issued another memorandum decision dated June 12, 
1991, in which the court admitted it had erred in its original ruling and that the ruling should 
be amended to reflect Doms was in default under the trust deed documents and he was not 
excused from performance. 
The work done by plaintiffs' counsel in successfully objecting to the court's earlier 
ruling and in obtaining these new findings and conclusions was substantial. The court 
acknowledged the substantial attorney fees and further acknowledged Plaintiffs would be 
entitled to fees for all the work their counsel did to obtain them. (R. 6485) Consequently, 
the Plaintiffs are entitled to substantial attorney fees for all this time. 
46 
on SCTC's motion to dismiss. (R. 02943) Because SCTC became insolvent before the third 
party complaint could be tried, Plaintiffs did not pursue this action. Although attorney fees were 
originally requested with respect to legal services involving SCTC, Plaintiffs stated at the 
evidentiary hearing on December 31, 1991, that they were not asking for an award against 
SCTC, since the case was never tried. Consequently, this category of attorney fees is not 
involved in the instant appeal, however, the third-party complaint was necessary and reasonable 
at the time it was filed.9 
Doms' statement that plaintiffs' counsel, "Either admitted in their affidavits or in their 
testimony at the hearing on attorneys fees that all of their requested fees were incurred defending 
against Doms' second amended counterclaim in the main case," is absolutely false! Plaintiffs' 
exhibit "3-P" at the December 31, 1991, evidentiary hearing on attorney fees demonstrates that 
all the fees did not relate solely to Doms' counterclaim. However, even if they did, Plaintiffs' 
defenses were necessary to protect the title and the validity of the trust deed which authorized 
attorney fees for services in appearing and defending the title to the property and the rights of 
the beneficiaries. (Exhibit 2, paragraph 4). 
B. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred in Civil No. 10066, the Tax-sale 
Case, Because Doms Failed to Pay the Taxes Which Resulted in the Extinguishment of 
Plaintiffs' Trust Deed. (Doms' Point VIB) 
Doms had an obligation under the trust deed to pay all taxes on Rossi Hills. However, 
he failed to pay any of the taxes. The taxes became delinquent immediately in the year 1982, 
and were also delinquent for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. On May 27, 1987, Summit County 
9
 Plaintiffs are also requesting this court order the award of all fees incurred in 
connection with this appeal, as well as all costs and expenses. These fees, costs, and 
expenses are expressly authorized by the trust deed and the trust deed note which Doms 
signed. As Doms acknowledges in his brief, attorney fees are properly awarded on appeal 
when there is a basis for such fees in the trial court. 
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held a tax sale to sell Rossi Hills for delinquent taxes. No one bid at the tax sale, therefore, the 
Summit County Auditor conveyed the property in fee simple title to Summit County. The 
impact of this conveyance was to extinguish Plaintiffs' trust deed. See Hanson v. Burris. 46 
P.2d 400, 406 (Utah 1935). Clearly, Doms and his successor corporation, Domcoy, were in 
default under the terms of the trust deed with respect to the taxes, irrespective of other defaults 
with respect to the monthly payments. 
In his brief, Doms states that he entered into a stipulation in court agreeing the tax sale 
could be declared void. Doms then asserts that because of the stipulation, no attorney fees 
should be given to Plaintiffs. What Doms neglects to disclose is that for the preceding year and 
a half, he resisted every effort to stipulate that the sale could be set aside. He filed an original 
answer and also an amended answer denying all Plaintiffs' claims for relief. Furthermore, 
Doms required Plaintiffs to conduct extensive discovery, including taking the depositions of 
numerous Summit County officials to prepare for the case. Doms required Plaintiffs to prepare 
a motion for summary judgment with respect to the tax case including an extensive memorandum 
showing why the tax sale was unconstitutional and should be set aside. After all of this work 
and a hearing on March 20, 1990, the court entered an order granting Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. 
Doms' claim that because he "stipulated" that the tax sale could be set aside he should 
not be responsible for the payment for the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs is absurd. The 
law is clear that even if Doms had stipulated to an amount claimed by Plaintiffs after the lawsuit 
was commenced, Plaintiffs would still be entitled to their attorney fees. Mountain States 
Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 834 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Highland Construction Company v. Stevenson. 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1981). 
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Doms argues there can be no attorney fees awarded for the tax case "Since Doms was 
excused from performance and not in default under the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, 
plaintiffs have absolutely no basis upon which to claim attorney's fees or costs." Again, it 
follows ipso facto that if the trial judge is right that Doms was not excused from performance 
but was in fact in default under the trust deed and the trust deed note, then all the attorney fees 
incurred in the tax case should be awarded as provided in the instruments. 
Furthermore, when Doms claims in his brief that he had absolutely nothing to do with 
the manner in which the tax sale was conducted by Summit County, he is asking this court to 
overlook the fact that he had the sole responsibility to pay the taxes on the property, and because 
he neglected to do so for each and every year he held title to the property, the property was sold 
for the delinquent taxes. It was Doms' sole default in the payment of the taxes due under the 
trust deed which resulted in the auditor's conveying the fee simple title to Summit County 
thereby extinguishing Plaintiffs' trust deed and Doms cannot escape his responsibility for 
attorney fees by saying that somehow the tax sale was a result of the conduct of other third 
parties. 
C. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to their Motions for Sanctions 
with Respect to Doms' Objections to Discovery Requests. (Doms' Point VIE) 
In Point VIE of his brief, Doms says Judge Frederick was wrong in awarding attorney 
fees to Plaintiffs for substantial legal services made necessary because of Doms' stubborn refusal 
to answer legitimate discovery requests. These fees were awarded pursuant to Rule 37 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The amount of the fees was not determined by Judge Frederick, 
that decision was left for the time of the trial. 
Judge Rokich allowed Doms a full evidentiary hearing on December 31, 1991 for several 
hours to determine the amount of attorney fees. After that evidentiary hearing, the court held 
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Plaintiffs were entitled to $4,700.00 pursuant to Judge Frederick's rulings. This amount was 
substantially less than the $11,875.00 requested by Plaintiffs for time spent solely on frivolous 
discovery motions filed by Doms. See Exhibit "7-P" admitted at the December 31, 1991. 
Plaintiffs submit Judge Frederick was completely justified in finding Doms violated 
discovery provisions of the rules of civil procedure. Of the thirty-five requests for production 
of documents, Doms objected to twenty-seven of them. Of the thirty-one requests for 
admissions submitted to Doms, his counsel objected to fifteen of them. The frivolous grounds 
for the objections and the stubbornness of Doms in refusing to respond to these legitimate 
discovery requests is more fully documented and discussed in "Involuntary Plaintiffs Anderson 
and Scott's Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Sanctions Against the Defendant 
Eugene E. Doms" dated April 18, 1989. In his minute entry, Judge Frederick directed Doms, 
"To respond to the discovery requests within thirty days of this minute entry ruling. Movant 
is granted reasonable attorney fees for the necessity of bringing motions; amount to be 
determined at trial." 
After Judge Frederick entered his June 22, 1989 minute entry, Doms filed a flurry of 
frivolous motions disagreeing with Judge Frederick on every point and requesting an inordinate 
amount of relief. Some twenty-five pleadings were filed by Doms and Plaintiffs in connection 
with this matter. All of this work by Doms' counsel necessitated further pleadings to be filed 
by Plaintiffs' counsel to respond to the frivolous motions and the matter was submitted to Judge 
Frederick. On August 10, 1989, Judge Frederick issued a second minute entry which denied 
all of Doms' motions. The minute entry again awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, 
on August 28, 1989, Judge Frederick signed an order setting out the substance of the two prior 
Minute Entries and also setting forth a partial list of some twenty-five pleadings which were 
involved in his rulings and for which he awarded the Plaintiffs attorney fees. 
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In addition to the problems caused by Doms refusal to answer legitimate discovery 
in|ui"4s iJniiiis MIIIIN'I iiiso aihisnl il in 111  ,n in. nlqioMlion in him1 •' 1W-J iiiiiiii i iiii mi 
numerous questions. These objections were based on the same reasons Doms had objected to 
'the discovery request \lfn ludjji' 1 ralcnck entm'd Ins mmuii /nin • ulmys ami ni Jn " v« " 
necessary to take a supplemental deposition of Doms which caused the Plaintiffs to incur 
additional court reporter expense, time, and other expenses and costs which would not have been 
necessary. 
Doms argues that he was not afforded an opportunity for a hearing before the amount of 
t'res w;is iissesscd .IIMUHS! Iiiiiiii) I !n\ assertior credible in light of the fact that an 
entire day on December 31, 1991, was devoted to an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney fees. 
affidavits or other documentary evidence regarding the fees, costs and expenses At the 
conclusion of the hearing counsel were allowed lo ni^tjjc in extensive oi al argument regarding 
these fees. The Plaintiffs submit they are entitled to their full requested attorney fees of 
$11,875.00, together with prejudgment interest, since all of these fees were reasonable and 
necessary i n :ll > c i e • incurred because of Doms' stubborn refusal to comply with legitimate 
discovery requests. 
D. I he Judgment of the I rial Court Should be Affirmed with Respect to the Attorney Fees 
and Costs Awarded to Plaintiffs, but it Should be Substantially Augmented. (Doms Point VIG) 
In Point VIG of his brief, Doms argues the trial court's award of $41,000.00 in attorney 
fees and $358.20 in costs to Plaintiffs should be reversed in its entirety. As discussed above, 
the attorney fees and costs awarded are not only justified by the evidence submitted at the 
DeixnibfT 11 llWI ruiluiluPi hcainij1 Iml HI iiiiiih «i .iiiiill (Mil \\\ llu fers mid cnsls which 
were incurred by Plaintiffs solely because of the stubborn and litigious nature of Doms' tactics 
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in this lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs submit they are entitled to all their attorney fees and court costs incurred as 
more fully set forth in Exhibits 1-P, 3-P, 4-P, 5-P, 6-P, 7-P, and 8-P which were introduced at 
the December 31, 1991 evidentiary hearing. 
With respect to costs, the Rule 54(d) URCP "costs" requested by Plaintiffs are more fully 
set forth in the "Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements" dated October 22, 1991. 
Exhibit "7" attached to the Mcintosh Affidavit itemizes some $22,866.39 in additional "costs 
and expenses" which were authorized by the trust deed and the trust deed note in addition to the 
Rule 54(d) costs. The trial court refused to allow any of these items, even though the trial judge 
specifically stated during the trial that a portion of the costs and expenses paid to the expert 
witnesses would be awarded to Plaintiffs because of Doms' withdrawal of his second cause of 
action. (R. 7928-7930) The court further admitted during the trial proceedings that the 
Plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees for all the work which was done subsequent to the court's 
memorandum decision dated October 4, 1990 and which resulted in the court's change of heart 
regarding the original finding that Doms was not excused by in performance and was not in 
default. (R. 6485). 
Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs submit they are entitled to all the fees, costs and 
expenses incurred as presented at the evidentiary hearing with the exception of those fees, costs, 
and expenses relating to the third-party complaint against Summit County Title Company. 
Plaintiffs are also entitled to their "costs and expenses," in addition to attorney fees. 
These "costs and expenses" are expressly provided in the trust deed note and the trust deed and 
are much broader than the Rule 54(d) URCP judicial "costs" provision. The language in the 
trust deed note states "If this note is collected by an attorney after default and the payment of 
principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree 
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to pay all costs and expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorneys fee." The phrase 
1
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Paragraph i the trust deed provides that upon default the beneficiary shall have the 
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manner provided by law and "Beneficiary shall be entitled to recovery in such proceeding all 
costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorneys fee in such amount as shall 
be fixed by the court." Again, this provision clearly allows Plaintiffs to obtain all their "costs 
and expenses" incurred in the lawsuit to foreclose their trust deed. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
POINT I 
THE STA1 UTE OF LIMI'I AI IONS BARRED DOMS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST BOTH VOLUNTARY AND 
INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS. 
(Plaintiffs Point I, Doms Point VII A & B) 
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erroneously applied the six-
year statute of limitations described by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) to this case when, In 
period. Plaintiffs also asserted that regardless of whether the four-year or six-year limitation 
period is applied, Doms' second
 counterclaim exceedt limitations period. 
In response, Doms asserts, without support, that the six-year limitation period is the 
correct limitation period to be applied. Doms furthermore claims that his counterclaim was filed 
within the applicable six-year period. Doms' responses are belied by the case law and the facts 
of this case. 
mitations applicable to actions upon any 
contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing is the applicable statute 
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of limitations, is set forth in Doms' brief without discussion and simply ignores the facts and 
the case law. In Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that an action for rescission is an equitable action and is governed by the four-year statute 
of limitations defined by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(2). Doms' brief fails to disclose that the 
first answer and counterclaim filed January 29, 1988, only sets forth a claim for rescission. 
Such actions would be governed, according to Baker, by the four-year statute of limitations and 
thus Doms' counterclaim filed five years and ten months after the warranty deed was recorded 
would govern and this first counterclaim would be outside that four-year period. The first 
answer and counterclaim filed on January 29, 1988, by Doms had nothing to do with an action 
on a contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing and therefore clearly 
was not governed by the six-year statute of limitations was Doms promotes. The counterclaim 
was filed two years after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. 
Only in Doms' second amended counterclaim, filed June 15, 1988, did Doms finally 
claim something more than rescission. However, this counterclaim was filed six years and three 
months after the issuance of the warranty deed, which was the basis for the action. Therefore, 
Doms was even outside the six-year limitations period for filing an action based on a written 
instrument. 
Doms' original answer and counterclaim filed on January 29, 1988, was not accepted by 
the trial court because a default judgment had been previously entered against Doms. Doms 
claims in his brief that the default judgment, which was entered on January 21, 1988, was 
"unbeknownst to Doms." However, this assertion also ignores the facts of the case. 
The record discloses that Doms knew that a motion for a default judgment had been filed. 
Indeed, Doms' attorney had signed a stipulation with Plaintiffs' attorney under which plaintiffs 
agreed to withdraw their motion for default judgment against Doms and Doms agreed to answer 
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Plaintiffs complaint by August 20, 1987 (1 19) When the period allowed by the stipulation 
after several more months, Plaintiffs' attorney filed a motion for default judgment, copies of 
which wen. sen! I" I Hi" 1 4\inn\ ,unl \hm\\ iiilniiin ||<' Ml When Ilk conn uikrnl lln 
default judgment against Doms on January 21, 1988, Doms was therefore aware of prior motions 
to enter default judgment against him, a stipulation under which a previous motion was 
withdrawn and an extension of time to file an answer had been granted, that no answer had been 
filed, and that a new certificate of default and motion for default judgment had been filed against 
iat default judgment was entered "unbeknownst" to him, is 
indeed quite disingenuous. 
n i ; y , 
agreed inter alia that his own certificate of compliance triggered the actual date the default 
judgment was set aside. Doms ignores e, 
June 1, 1988, was six years and 2-1/2 months after the deed was recorded, 21/2 months after 
the limitations period described by §7g_j2-23(2) had expired. 
I the Utah Supreme Court has held that the four-year statute of limitations for 
cases in equity is applicable to rescission actions. Doms' first answer and counterclaim alleged 
mil " .JI iir ill i* i" nil ill 111 in ill I mi ivsnssinn ami was ilirniiin; pn'niiin) by (Ir lour yeai statute of" 
limitations but was beyond that period. Only in Doms' second answer and counterclaim did he 
a l l e g e 'tl'Ul i » i r l i n n i\l|i< h l i l if 'M i , M " ' " "l,,(" l " , ' | l* , , l , ,i(i?((" lit illllKHitdliiiiiK whin |i ^ n y n i i i ^ w i i K n n 
instruments. However, because actions and subsequent agreement, that 
counterclaim was not filed and officially accepted In Die dial in! iiiiiil .ilier the six )i"ai |iennd 
had expired. Further, Doms voluntarily dismissed his only pled contract claim. Doms' causes 
of actions, including the cause inserted by the court, simply should have not been allowed 
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because they were outside the limitations period. 
POINT II 
DOMS' COUNTERCLAIM COULD NOT RELATE BACK TO 
THE DATE THAT PLAINTIFFS' FILED THEIR 
FORECLOSURE ACTION. 
(Plaintiffs' Point II, Doms' Point VII C&D) 
Despite Doms' request that the trial court rule that Doms' second amended counterclaim 
related back to the date of Plaintiffs' complaint (R.4463-66), the trial court never entered a 
ruling with respect to the statute of limitations and whether the counterclaim by Doms in fact 
did relate back to the original complaint filed by the Plaintiffs. In their opening brief, Plaintiffs 
asserted that the trial court should have ruled that Doms' counterclaim did not relate back and 
that therefore the trial court erroneously allowed Doms' counterclaim to proceed to trial. 
Plaintiffs asserted in their brief that this court should not consider whether the second amended 
counterclaim filed by Doms related back to Plaintiffs' original complaint because of the lack of 
a ruling by the trial court. Further, Plaintiffs asserted that even if this court were to reach the 
issue of relation back, the case law from this court, if correctly applied to this case, dictates that 
Doms' second amended counterclaim does not relate back. 
Here, as in the trial court, Doms attempts to save his cause of action by arguing that the 
second amended counterclaim does relate back to the date of the filing of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
Doms does not disclose that the trial court issued no ruling on this issue and gives no reason 
why this court should address the issue.10 Doms argues that the counterclaims "arise out of the 
transaction" alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint. Doms further argues that the relation back doctrine 
applies to involuntary plaintiffs Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott. He argues that the involuntary 
10Ordinarily, a trial court's failure to address a critical issue, is grounds for an appellate 
court to remand the proceedings to the trail court to resolve the issue. 
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plaintiffs have an identity of interest, as that term has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court, 
sufficient In lillniu I hi; <ipplii ilium nil Hi in ill" Ii iiiii I inm- .iii'iniit'iil ignore < tin1 lads <>l 111 is i ,ise 
and the rulings of the trial court. 
In Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York. /()( I" Jill 'iKIL 'iKfii 11 Hiill O A|ifi !lliKH), 
this court stated that Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which defines the relation 
back doctrine, "does not apply to amendments which substitute or add new parties to those 
eht before the court by the original pleadings, because such amendments amount to assertion 
new cause of action and defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations." Only when the 
back is not prejudicial will relation back be applied.11 
In this case, Plaintiffs original action was an aciiui loreclosc 
trust deed note that financed a portion of the transaction to which only Mr. Scott and Mr. 
Anderson were parties. Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson, both of whom signed the warranty deed 
r the transaction), were not parties to the financing portion of the transaction, 
(the trust deed and trust deed note). Therefore, Doms cannot meet the first requirement of Rule 
pleadings, to invoke the relation back doctrine. Doms' counterclaims concen . . sales 
transaction (the warranty deed) not the financing transaction, lime irusl Mini an ,1! limn mole. 
Doms has cited Moffitt v. Barr. 837 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), in support of his 
argument. However, Doms ignores the context in which Moffitt arose and concerns expressed 
n Doms asserts that Plaintiffs have mistakenly relied on Vina and Schiavone v. Fortune, 
477 U.S. 21(1986), cited in Vina, in defining when the relation back doctrine applies. 
However, Doms' claim ignores the application of Schiavone in Vina and pronouncements 
from the Utah Supreme Court which have the effect of implementing Schiavone. See e.g. 
Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
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by the court of appeals in Moffitt which dictated its outcome. Moffitt arose under a statutory 
savings clause which granted an additional year in which to file a complaint to a party whose 
original complaint had been dismissed for procedural reasons. 837 P.2d at 573. This court 
ruled that a counterclaim was not barred during the additional year even though the limitations 
period for counterclaims had passsed for three reasons. First, the court expressed concern that 
if the permitted extension of the statute of limitations did not apply equally to complaints and 
counterclaims, unscrupulous plaintiffs would be provided with a means of sabotaging a 
defendant's right to assert a valid counterclaim. 837 P.2d at 574. Second, the court was 
concerned that the application of the savings clause to only complaints would subvert the delay-
prevention function of statutes of limitations and prolong the litigation process to the detriment 
of defendants. Id. Third, the court stated that in situations where both parties were reluctant 
litigants, "an even-handed application for the savings clause" would tend to discourage lawsuits. 
837 P.2d at 575. For these reasons, the court fashioned a remedy invoking the relation back 
doctrine which was applicable to situations specifically arising out of the savings clause at issue 
in that case. Id. 
In this case, Plaintiffs' actions did not rely on the savings clause. Furthermore, none of 
the concerns expressed by the court for the even-handed application of the savings clause in 
Moffitt are applicable to this case. Indeed, Doms' counterclaim was filed years after Plaintiffs' 
original complaint. Plaintiffs did not postpone commencement of their action and their action 
in no way prejudiced Doms. Indeed, if the Moffitt factors are analyzed with respect to this case, 
the only conclusion which can be reached is that allowing Doms' counterclaim to relate back to 
Plaintiffs' original complaint would prejudice the Plaintiffs in this case and would allow Doms 
to manipulate the system in precisely the way which the Moffitt Court sought to circumvent. 
For these reasons, Doms' invocation of the relation back doctrine, even if it is addressed 
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by this Court, is simply not applicable to the facts of this case. 
POIN'I Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DOMS WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE DEED TRANSACTION 
PRECLUDED THE SUBSEQUENT TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF 
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE WARRANTIES 
CONTAINED IN THE DEED (ELECTION OF REMEDIES). 
(Plaintiffs' Point III; Doms' Point VIII) 
In I  l i i i i ' i I  mi in in .in II »«wi i in in IL in in 11 «i H HI 1 i 11 i 11111 "in 11,11111 lie n Lnnnirnl IHIIIIII ICSCISSIOII iiJiil damages Ini linMl 
profits that were a result of the alleged breach of warranty against encumbrances contained in 
the warranty deed (R 237 49) Both of these remedies were based i .. .. n, 
alleged violation of the covenants contained in the warranty deed. 
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court first required Doms to elect 
but then, it ruled against Doms on the issue of rescission following a trial on 
that issue, the court allowed Doms to go forward on the issue of damages based on an unalleged 
Plaintiffs claimed that Doms pursuit of the rescission remedy foreclosed his subsequent pursuit 
of the unalleged remedy of damages. 
In response, Doms boldly, and erroneously, asserts that "a party has not been required 
to 'elect remedies' since at least the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" in 
1950. Doms then cites Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the case of Smoot v. 
Lund, 369 P.2d 933 (Utah 1962), allegedly in support of his position The plain language of 
interpreted it as well as an analysis of Smoot plainly 
show that Doms' assertion is wrong. 
Neither Rule IIIIIMII MI LK I A\\\ nil iln IIIIK i iniK«. i, Hi ill! \\\ I loin1, moi Smoot elmiitylcs 
the doctrine of election of remedies. Doms has confused pleading of inconsistent causes of 
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action, which is allowed by Rule 8 and Smoot, with the doctrine of election of remedies. 
Nothing in Rule 8 even addresses the issue of election of remedies. Furthermore, Smoot 
specifically states "we are unaware of authorities cited by defendant which have held that a 
plaintiff may not proceed both in contract and in tort. . . ." 369 P.2d at 935. In other words, 
what the Rule and Smoot do allow is a party's alleging prior to trial inconsistent causes of action 
or theories of the case. 
The doctrine of election of remedies has been upheld in several appellate cases in this 
state. See, e ^ , Roval Resources v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp.. 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979) ("the 
defense of election of remedies is an affirmative one . . ."); Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. 
Machinery Center, Inc.. 613 P.2d 510, 512 (Utah 1980) ("the doctrine of election of remedies 
which prevents a party from recovering more than once for the same loss, is based upon 
principles of equity and justice"); Aneelos v. First Interstate Bank. 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983) 
(discussing the application of the doctrine of election of remedies in a specific case). Despite 
Doms' attempt to bury it, the doctrine of election of remedies is alive and well in Utah, as long 
as some prerequisites to invocation of the doctrine are met. 
In Roval Resources, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the doctrine presupposes a 
"choice" between inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one of the remedies and 
a resort to the chosen remedy as evidencing the purpose to forego other remedies. 603 P.2d at 
796. Furthermore, pursuit of a remedy to an adjudication forecloses pursuit of another remedy 
even if the pursuit of the first remedy appears futile. Mendenhall v. Kingston. 610 P.2d 1287, 
1289 (Utah 1980); Roval Resources. 603 P.2d at 799, Maughan, J. dissenting. 
In this case, before the trial on the issue of rescission, the trial court required Doms to 
elect his remedy. (R. 7087). Doms elected rescission as the appropriate remedy. (R. 7087) 
Later the trial court affirmed the decision and noted that Doms "can't have it both ways . . . ." 
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(R 7759) However, after Doms lost on the remedy of rescission the trial court, despite its prior 
ruling, all urn I lliiiii In (inn i i il im (In1 issue ml iLieuyes imdci llit1 hrv.nli nil w iii;inh illri'alinn. 
Once the trial court decided that Doms was not entitled to rescission, it should not have allowed 
a trial to determine whether Doms w.is t: ' " i inugi1- " Mimr \i\ i MMI I existing 
remedies on which he had a right to elect, m open court, Doms elected rescission as his 
remedy, a decisive act which indicated his choice between inconsistent remedies and a trial 
thereon resulted. Therefore, failure on the breach of warranty claim when he requested 
rescission as the remedy should have foreclosed subsequent action in which he sought and 
POINT IV 
THE DEED FROM DOMCOY TO DOMS WAS > < )ID. 
(Plaintiffs' Point IV; Doms' Point IX) 
In their opening brief, as they did in the trial court, Plaintiffs asserted that the deed from 
collaterally attack the warranty deed from Domcoy to Doms because they are strangers to the 
deed; Domcoy had the authority to convey Rossi Hills to I Joins., Hir warranty 
Domcoy to Doms was a valid conveyance; and McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills 
when the sheriff's sale, foreclosing McCoy's one-half interest, was conducted and therefore 
Plaintiffs' ownership in the property from the sheriff's sale. 
Doms' assertion that a deed which is voidable for some defect cannot be collaterally 
argument - rescission. In 
order to tender good title back to Plaintiffs in the rescission action, Doms' title would have had 
12Furthermore, in none of Doms' counterclaims did he present a cause of action 
requesting damages for a breach of the covenants contained in the warranty deed. This fact 
alone should have precluded the subsequent trial on the issue of damages. 
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to have been perfected. Certainly, Doms does not suggest that Plaintiffs lacked the ability to 
demonstrate to the trial court that he was incapable of tendering good title in the rescission 
action because of the void transfer from Domcoy to him or the prior sheriff's sale of McCoy's 
one-half interest. 
Doms cites a provision of the former Utah Business Corporation Act and states that only 
stockholders and creditors of the corporation have standing to object to a transfer of a corporate 
asset. While this is correct, Doms ignores the fact that Plaintiffs are not objecting to the transfer 
of corporate assets, but are rather questioning the validity of the transfer. Clearly stockholders 
may ratify and repudiate voidable acts of the corporation; however, no evidence exists in this 
case that that verification action has ever been taken by the stockholders of Domcoy. 
The evidence in this case clearly established that Domcoy had four directors (R. 7518) 
and that no changes had occurred therein. While McCoy and his wife gave their voting rights 
in Domcoy as demonstrated by Exhibit 28, Domcoy's attorney requested their resignations, no 
resignations were ever tendered. (R. 7517-18) Therefore, Doms' assertion that he became 
the only officer and director of Domcoy is untrue. Mr. and Mrs. McCoy and Mrs. Doms were 
still directors. Furthermore, Doms' assertion that the corporation became his alter ego and that 
only the "bare legal title holder" of Rossi Hills is not true and is unsupported by the evidence. 
Domcoy had creditors and other stockholders. 
In this case, Domcoy did not merely liquidate corporate assets, it purchased Rossi Hills 
from the county at a tax sale and thereafter gave the property Doms. Clearly, the corporation 
transacted business other than the mere liquidation of assets all contrary to the Utah law as 
indicated in Plaintiffs' brief. 
Finally, without citing any cases to support the assertion, Doms asserts that McCoy had 
no interest in Rossi Hills that could be sold at the sheriffs sale. Originally, Doms and McCoy 
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transferred Rossi Hills to a trustee named in the trust deed and the trustee then held the interest 
property were always subject to the prior transfer to the trustee. However , trust conditions were 
broken and therefore, IVlki, "uy \ inicrcsl, in nccordancc Willi Hit" LOIKIHIOIIS ol (hi; c ik i imhia i i ie , 
was sold by the sheriff. Each subsequent owner of the property who acquired title subsequent 
to the trust deed took the title subject to the prior transfer and the final foreclosure of M c C o y ' s 
interest. "The general rule which ranks mortgages and other interests in mortgaged property in 
order of their acquisition applies deeds of trust in the nature of mortgages ." 55 A m . Jur. 2d 
Mortgages §.U-il I  m l l i u m i m ml i liiiiinil i inuihl lluil A\\\ ru r imi l i imur v Im, li ill Jit I ILLS io 
mortgaged property after the execution of the mortgage is subject to the mortgage and it is 
beyond the powei of the mortgagoi itc distui 1: the pi ioi it) c f the mortgage * n. 
Id. at §323 . Final ly, a mortgagor may not set up an "outstanding paramount title in a third 
person as against the mortgagee Indeed, a mortgagor is ordinarily estopped to dispute the 
title mor tgage . " Id. at §240. 
At the t ime D o m s filed his counterclaim he had no interest in the property. D o m s did 
which he then received was void. Domcoy Enterprises, which owned the property, did not meet 
y. 
Therefore, the transfer to Doms was a nullity. 
POIN I" V 
DOMS' COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED 
BECAUSE DOMS WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY ITI 
INTEREST. 
Plaintiffs asserted in their opening brief that the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion 
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to dismiss the counterclaim because Doms had failed to join his partner McCoy in the 
counterclaim was erroneous. Plaintiffs cited case law from this jurisdiction, which Doms does 
not dispute, that a single partner may not maintain an action in his own name when the property 
in question was procured by a partnership. Appellant's brief at 25-59. 
In response, Doms claims that he is the real party in interest because his partner, McCoy, 
"defaulted out" of the proceedings and left Doms alone to assert the counterclaim against 
Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Doms asserts that he and McCoy did not purchase Rossi Hills as a 
partnership and that Rossi Hills was not partnership property. Doms' argument ignores his own 
testimony and other relevant facts in the case. 
The question initially arises, as pointed out in Plaintiffs' opening brief, whether Doms 
could be a real party in interest because at the time he filed the counterclaim he had no interest 
in Rossi Hills. At the time of the counterclaim, the property was held either by Domcoy 
Enterprises (Exhibit 16 & 31) or Summit County by reason of the tax sale. Doms' 
counterclaims were filed effective June 1, 1988, according to the certificate of compliance filed 
by Doms. However, Doms did not receive the deed from Domcoy until August 26, 1988. 
(Exhibit 17.) Therefore, at the time of the filing of the counterclaim, Doms had no interest in 
the property. 
Doms also claims that he and McCoy were not partners. However, this assertion ignores 
Doms' own extensive testimony in which he stated that his relationship with McCoy was that 
of a partner. (R. 7627-28; 7389) Doms answered the partnership question affirmatively not 
once, but twice, once in relation to a question by the judge. Even Doms' own attorney conceded 
". . . it was bought as a partnership with McCoy" (R. 7161) and "they may have been general 
partners in the acquisition of this property, but partners are not automatically bound by the other 
. . . ." (R. 7328) Plaintiffs did not institute the action against Doms and McCoy as partners 
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because their partnership was unknown to Plaintiffs; however, at the time of Doms' 
ii iiiiliinJ.iiiiii, as uhsiqiienl (cstinionv ik'monstraU's, lie <nnl Mi.l'ns IliinJI bmi I'MIIIICIS MI HI ' 
acquisition of Rossi Hills. Therefore, according to case law set forth in plaintiffs opening brief, 
Doms \\;v ill ill (lit ii.Mil pit! I1, mi iiileicsi mi luhuion in I lie counterclaim because a single partner 
cannot bring an action in his own name when the property was procured by a partnership. 
Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). 
POINT VI 
DOMS WAS A REMOTE GRANTEE AND HAD NO CLAIM 
UNDER THE DEED FROM PLAINTIFFS. 
(Plaintiffs' Point VI; Doms' Po" 
Plaintiffs argued in the trial court that Doms was a remote grantee and thus could not 
bring a claim liant against encumbrances breachcu £. 
6864) The trial court did not rule on this issue despite Plaintiffs' objections. In their opening 
brief Plaintiffs argued that because the covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant, 
it does not run with the land. Doms acquired his title from Domcoy only after his answer and 
counterclaim had been filed and therefore Doms was a remote grantee \ remote grantee may 
* \ i -
a covenant against encumbrances against the grantor. 
Domcoy merely held the bare legal title for the benefit of Doms. Secondly, Doms argues that 
Plaintiffs breached the covenant of general warranty of title when they delivered the 
warranty deed in 1982 and that since this warranty runs with the land, even if Doms is the 
remote grantee, he could bring an action based on breach of this covenant. Finally, Doms 
ofactioi ^representation 
is independent of his status as an original or remote grantee. Doms' assertions are unsupported 
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by the record, case law, and, in one instance, have been raised for the first time on appeal. 
Doms does not dispute plaintiffs contention that the covenant against encumbrances is 
a personal covenant, which does not run with the land, and therefore is not enforceable as by 
a remote grantee. Doms' assertion that he was always the true owner of Rossi Hills and that 
Domcoy held only the bare legal title for the benefit of Doms is not supported by either the 
record or case law. The Utah Supreme Court has defined a bare legal title holder as "the trustee 
of an express, constructive, or resulting trust, or an agent, or mere conduit for the transfer to 
the true owner." Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank. 723 P.2d 398,401 (Utah 1986). 
The court also stated in Barlow Society that when a party asserts that he has obtained title from 
a bare legal title holder, the party must present evidence showing that the party to be considered 
the bare legal title holder was a trustee, an agent or a mere conduit. An unsupported allegation 
that a party is a bare legal title holder is insufficient. 723 P.2d at 401. 
In this case Doms presented no evidence at trial that would indicate that Domcoy was a 
trustee, agent, or mere conduit. In fact, the record reveals that Doms and McCoy, through 
Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real estate business in Utah. (R. 7539-41; 7560) 
Shortly after Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy, Domcoy developed a joint 
venture agreement for the development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties. (Exhibits 
81,82) From 1982 Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on Rossi Hills and in 1988 
Summit County sold to Domcoy the interest it had acquired by reason of the tax sale. For all 
intents and purposes, Domcoy was the genuine owner of Rossi Hills after the conveyance from 
Doms and McCoy to it and Doms presented no evidence which would support any other 
inference. 
Doms also argues that Plaintiffs breached the covenant of general warranty of title in 
addition to the covenant against encumbrances. This argument, however, has been raised by 
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Doms for the first time on appeal. Generally, this court will not consider arguments which have 
not been presented to the trial court. In addition, Doms simply has not made out the elements 
to invoke a breach of covenant of general warranty of title. 
A breach of the general warranty of title, with one exception not applicable to this case, 
does not occur until the party seeking to recover for the breach has been evicted from the land 
by one having paramount title. East Canyon Land & S. Co. v. Davis and Weber Counties Canal 
Co.. 238 P. 280, 281 (Utah 1925). A paramount title may coexist with the purported owner's 
title but the mere existence of a superior title does not constitute a breach of the covenant of 
warranty and the grantee has no cause of action if he or she is not disturbed in some way. 
Brown v. Lober. 389 N.E. 2d 1188 (111. 1979). In this case, while Doms' lawyer may believe 
that superior title exists because of the encumbrances, no party possessing one of the purported 
easements has ever asserted the title against Doms or any other owner of Rossi Hills. 
Therefore, contrary to Doms' assertion, the covenant of warranty of title has not been breached. 
Finally, Doms asserts that his cause of action for misrepresentation is independent of the 
covenants contained in the warranty deed. However, Doms overlooks the fact that the trial court 
held that he had presented insufficient evidence to maintain his action for misrepresentation. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the counterclaim itself, the only allegations of 
misrepresentation concern the insertion of the word "special" in the warranty deed, an apparent 
violation of the earnest money agreement. Doms overlooks the fact that the earnest money 
agreement had been merged into the warranty deed. In this case, Doms sued on his own behalf 
to claim his deed as a warranty deed from Domcoy Enterprises. If there was a breach of 
covenants against encumbrances, Doms action was therefore against Domcoy, his immediate 
predecessor in title, not against Plaintiffs. Only the Doms/McCoy partnership, the original 
grantee under the warranty deed at issue, had a cause of action against Plaintiffs for breach of 
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the covenant against encumbrances. The court should have dismissed the counterclaim on this 
basis alone. 
POINT VII 
DOMS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF THE ACCESS 
EASEMENT PRIOR TO THE PURCHASE OF ROSSI HILLS 
SHOULD HAVE BARRED HIS CLAIM OF A VIOLATION OF 
THE COVENANT AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES. 
(Plaintiffs' Point VII; Doms' Point IC) 
As previously stated, the trial court found that Doms knew or should have known at the 
time he purchased Rossi Hills that a prior attempt to develop it with two other parcels had failed. 
(R. 6882) The court also found that Doms knew that "there were roads and shed on the 
property" because of his tour of the property in the fall of 1981. (R. 6883) Finally, the trial 
court found that Doms had "actual notice of the easement encroachments" sometime in October 
or November of 1981 and that Doms' subsequent actions demonstrated that he had "personal 
knowledge of the road and encroachments" no later than October of 1982. (R. 6883) 
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs asserted that Doms should not have been permitted to 
accept the conveyance knowing of the encroachments and then claim a breach of the covenant 
against encumbrances. Plaintiffs pointed out that the Utah position which finds open, 
irremediable easements to be the violations of the covenant against encumbrances is clearly a 
minority position and that the more recent cases which have upheld that position have been in 
instances where the encroachment complained of was not openly apparent. Bergstrom v. Moore, 
677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984); Breuer-Harrison. Inc.. 799 P.2d at 725. Finally, Plaintiffs 
argued that if the visible encumbrances damaged the estate, that fact was taken into account in 
fixing the sale price of the estate. Doms has not really responded to this issue, but instead in 
Point IC of his brief discusses the reason why he believes that laches cannot be applied against 
him. 
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As previously noted, Doms has not attempted to refute the findings made by the trial 
court which support its ruling. A person should not be allowed to knowingly buy property with 
an open and obvious easement of which he is aware and then immediately sue the seller for the 
defect of which the buyer had knowledge. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REDUCED THE 
AMOUNT DUE THE ESTATE OF D. C. ANDERSON EVEN 
THOUGH DOMS' CLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE NON-
CLAIM STATUTE. 
(Plaintiffs' Point VIII; Doms' Point IVB) 
The trial court entered the following finding of fact: 
48. Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages 
against the estate of D. C. Anderson within three months after the 
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided in 
Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
(R.6884) Based on this finding, the trial court concluded that Doms' second amended 
counterclaim which sought damages against Ellen Anderson as the personal representative of the 
estate was barred by the three-month filing period for claims against the estate. (R. 6897) 
Despite this ruling, the court in essence assessed damages against the estate by reducing the 
amount due the estate from Doms even though his claim against the estate was barred. 
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs argued that the court's ruling concerning the non-claim 
statute, i.e. that Doms' claim against the estate was barred, was correct and that therefore the 
full amount due the estate of D. C. Anderson as a one-half owner of the promissory note should 
have been awarded without any deduction, setoff or other charge. 
In addition to other issues concerning the correctness of the court's ruling on the non-
claim statute, discussed earlier in this brief, Doms responds to Plaintiffs' assertion by alleging 
that the cases cited in support of Plaintiffs' assertion have been overruled. Furthermore, Doms 
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claims that he is entitled to a setoff against the purchase price of Rossi Hills for all damages 
which were suffered even though an apparent conflict exists in allowing such a setoff with a non-
claim statute. 
Doms' statement that the cases relied on by Plaintiffs, Rockhill v. Creer. 189 P. 668 
(Utah 1920) and Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath. 258 P. 342 (Utah 1927), have been 
overruled by subsequent cases from the Utah Supreme Court is clearly wrong. Neither of the 
cases cited by Doms, Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) and In Re: Estate of 
Sharp. 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975), even mentions either Rockhill or Halloran-Judge Trust, 
much less overrules them. Rather, both cases stand for the proposition that claims for specific 
performance are not claims barred by the non-claim statute. Bradshaw. 649 P.2d at 77 and In 
Re: Estate of Sharp. 537 P.2d at 1037. 
With respect to Doms' argument that even if his counterclaim is barred by the non-claim 
statute, he is entitled to a setoff against the estate for all damages which he suffered, Doms 
misreads the cases which he cites. The cases cited by Doms, Jacobsen v. Bunker. 699 P.2d 
1208 (Utah 1985), Salt Lake Citv v. Telluride Power Co.. 17 P.2d 281 (Utah 1932); and 
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler. 144 P.2d 276 (Utah 1943), do not involve the non-claim 
statute. More importantly, and a fact overlooked by Doms, each of the three cases involved a 
claim that the party against whom the setoff was sought held money that would have been the 
subject of a counterclaim by the opposing party but for the invocation of the statute of 
limitations. None of the three cases involves a claim for damages in an undetermined amount 
to be recovered by the counterclaim which was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, none of the cases addresses the issue of the non-claim statute and its position with 
respect to these cases. 
Despite Doms' protestations to the contrary, Rockhill is still the law in this state. In 
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Rockhill. the supreme court held that since the defendant had not complied with the requirements 
of the non-claim statute, he was not entitled to plead any sums due to him by the intestate by 
way of a setoff or counterclaim to the demands of the estate. The court stated claims must be 
presented to the personal representative in a prescribed period of time and that any claim not so 
presented was barred. It followed, the court stated, that since no claim was ever presented 
against the estate no plea of setoff or counterclaim could be maintained against the estate. 
Doms' assertion that he is entitled to a setoff against the estate is simply not supported by the 
cases which he cites and is contrary to the law established by Rockhill. 
POINT IX 
ELLEN ANDERSON AND JEANNE SCOTT WERE 
ERRONEOUSLY JOINED AS INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS. 
(Plaintiffs' Point IX; Doms' Point XII) 
The original action filed in this case by Plaintiffs was for foreclosure of a trust deed. 
Doms moved to join Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott as involuntary plaintiffs because he claimed 
each "had an interest in the trust deed note" despite the fact that neither had signed either the 
trust deed note or the trust deed. Eventually the trial court ruled that Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. 
Scott should be joined as involuntary plaintiffs. (R. 249) In their opening brief, Plaintiffs 
contended that the joinder of Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson as involuntary plaintiffs was 
improper and they should have been joined only as third party defendants by Doms. However, 
their joinder as third party defendants would have been barred by the statute of limitations. 
In response, Doms argues that this issue is moot because of a ruling issued by the Utah 
Supreme Court in response to Plaintiffs' petition for an extraordinary writ in that court. 
Plaintiffs did seek extraordinary relief before the Utah Supreme Court and raised the 
questions of whether the district court had jurisdiction and whether Mrs. Scott and Mrs. 
Anderson were appropriate parties. In his brief, Doms cites only part of the supreme court's 
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ruling on this issue. The court's complete ruling was as follows: 
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied because the 
district court has jurisdiction over both petitioners inasmuch as 
they were grantors on the deed, and both are proper parties to the 
counterclaim for rescission under URCP #13 and 19. Further, 
under district court ruling, petitioner Scott still has an opportunity 
to move for dismissal at least as to one issue, and district court has 
not yet ruled on statute of limitations defense of petitioners to 
counterclaim. 
Importantly, the court did not rule that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were proper involuntary 
plaintiffs under the trust deed note as alleged by Doms, only that they were "proper parties" to 
the counterclaim for rescission on the deed. Plaintiffs do not dispute this. In fact, Plaintiffs 
have alleged that to be proper parties, the action should have been filed against Mrs. Scott and 
Mrs. Anderson as third party defendants, which it was not. Had this been done, however, 
Doms would have had significant statute of limitations problems.13 
Clearly, all parties to an agreement must be present in a case for rescission and therefore 
could be joined under Rule 13, however, the question remains as to whether the proper joinder 
of Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson was as involuntary plaintiffs or as third party defendants. In 
their opening brief, Plaintiffs have cited several Utah Supreme Court cases which indicate that 
these parties should have been joined as third party defendants rather than as involuntary 
plaintiffs. The only reason Doms joined them as involuntary plaintiffs, although such joinder 
is not authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial court did not follow the proper 
procedure for such joinder, was to avoid the application of the statute of limitations. The trial 
court refused to make appropriate findings in relation to the joinder issue although specifically 
requested by Plaintiffs to do so. At trial, Doms tried extensively to establish that Mrs. Scott and 
13Significantly, the supreme court left the issue of statute of limitations issue raised by 
Doms' counterclaim as to all plaintiffs for resolution by the trial court. However, as 
previously noted, the trial court refused to issue a ruling on the issue. 
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Mrs. Anderson had an interest in the trust deed and trust deed note; however, he failed to do 
so. Therefore, at the trial, it is clearly apparent that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were 
improperly joined as involuntary plaintiffs. 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS 
METHODOLOGY OF FORECLOSURE FOR THAT PROVIDED 
BY THE CONTRACT AND THE STATUTE. 
(Plaintiffs' Point X; No Response By Doms) 
In their opening brief, plaintiffs argued that the trial court imposed its own method of 
foreclosure on the trust deed and ignored the methods for foreclosure provided by contract and 
statute. Nothing in the court's findings support a conclusion that its methodology for foreclosure 
was correct. In addition, despite the court's finding that the trust deed note provided for 
payment of interest in the amount of 14% prior to default and 18% after default (R. 6889), the 
court concluded that interest should be paid at the rate of 14% on all amounts. (R. 6898) This 
conclusion also was not supported by a factual finding. 
Doms has not responded on this issue. This court should conclude that the trial court 
erred when it substituted its judgment as to the method of foreclosure for that provided by the 
contract between the parties and/or statute. The district court should be directed to allow the 
Plaintiffs to proceed with a special execution and sheriff's sale as provided by the statute and 
the trust deed and impose interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of default. 
POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY MODIFIED THE 
TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED NOTE WHEN IT AWARDED 
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. 
(Plaintiffs' Point XI; Partially Addressed by Doms' Point III) 
Plaintiffs argued that because Doms' final counterclaim requested only rescission and/or 
damages for lost profits and/or damages for fraud/misrepresentation, no claim for reformation 
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of any of the instruments had been presented. Therefore, several of the trial court's conclusions 
which effectively modified the terms of the trust deed note were erroneous. Some of the 
arguments set forth by Doms in his Point III addressed ancillary issues and have been addressed 
previously in this brief. With respect to this issue however, Doms does not contest the fact that 
no pleadings or proof that would support reformation of the trust deed and/or the trust deed note 
were presented to the trial court. Nothing claimed by Doms supported the trial court's 
modification of the foreclosure methodology or the court's action in changing the terms of the 
contracts. 
POINT XII 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED 
PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY FEES FOR ALL OF THE WORK 
EXPENDED IN DEFENDING THE VALIDITY OF THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE TRUST DEED, INCLUDING 
THE DEFENSE AGAINST THE RESCISSION CLAIM. 
(Plaintiffs' Point XII; Partially Answered by Doms' Point VI) 
Plaintiffs complained in their opening brief that the trial court erred when it refused to 
grant the Plaintiffs attorney fees for a significant portion of the work performed on this case. 
To some extent Doms has addressed this issue in Point VI of his brief in which he claims that 
the trial court erred in awarding any attorney fees and costs to Plaintiffs. That specific issue has 
been addressed elsewhere in this brief. 
As previously noted, the trust deed and the trust deed note specifically provided for the 
award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were clearly required to defend against Doms' 
rescission action, otherwise the trust deed and trust deed note would have been eliminated. As 
point out in Plaintiffs' opening brief, the defense of the rescission action was tantamount to the 
defense of the trust deed and the trust deed note and therefore additional attorney fees should 
have been awarded for the successful defense against the rescission action. However, the court 
74 
did not award such fees. As noted in the Plaintiffs' opening brief, cases from the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court have stated that defendants who have asserted an unmeritorious 
counterclaim should have attorney fees awarded against them if there is a contractual right to 
the fees. In the finance portion of this transaction, the trust deed and trust deed note, Doms 
contracted to pay the fees incurred in collection and defense of title and the trial court erred 
when it did not award fees to Plaintiffs for their defense of the rescission action or fully 
compensate them for the action to clear the title from the claim of Summit County. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief and the appellants' opening brief, plaintiffs request 
that that portion of the judgment based on Doms' counterclaim be reversed and that the case be 
remanded to the trial court for dismissal of Doms' counterclaim and entry of judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs, including an award of all the requested attorneys fees. Additionally, plaintiffs 
request that the trial court's decision on rescission, the existence of separate contracts, Doms' 
counterclaim against the estate of D. C. Anderson, and Doms' lack of entitlement to an award 
of attorney fees be affirmed. 
DATED this \Q day of March, 1994. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
H. BIELE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants and 
Cross-Appellees 
75 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF 
CROSS-APPELLEES/REPLY OF APPELLANTS was either hand delivered or mailed by 
United States Mail, postage prepaid this }{j day of March, 1994, to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
Craig L. Boorman, Esq. 
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM A 
MEMORANDA FILED BY PLAINTIFFS 
RECORD 
DATE PAGES SUBJECTS COVERED 
08/16/88 336-343 Statute of Limitations, Necessary Parties, Rescission 
09/09/88 429-449 Jurisdiction over Jeanne Scott 
Point 1. Utah Courts cannot acquire in personam jurisdiction over 
the involuntary plaintiff Jeanne Scott because: (1) Defendant 
Doms' second amended counterclaim does not allege any facts 
establishing Jeanne Scott's non-resident status nor any facts 
establishing "long arm" jurisdiction over Jeanne Scott; (2) Jeanne 
Scott has not had any "ownership, possession or use" of any of the 
real property described in the second amended counterclaim; (3) 
Jeanne Scott has not had significant minimal contacts with the State 
of Utah to make it reasonable in the context of our federal system 
of government to defend the second amended counterclaim, and 
requiring Jeanne Scott to appear in this action clearly offends 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
09/20/88 460-483 Jurisdiction over Jeanne Scott 
Point 1. Jeanne Scott's Motion for Reconsideration should be 
granted because it is clear the trial judge misconstrued the 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to the circumstances in the instant case, in that the 
trial judge stated several times the United States Supreme Court in 
"Volkswagen" allowed in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident, whereas the actual holding of the court was just the 
opposite, and the trial judge appeared to have adopted the 
reasoning of the three dissenting justices on how the case should 
have been decided — but wasn't. 
Point 2. Ellen Anderson's Motion for Leave to Bring in Third-
party Defendant - Summit County Title Company - should be 
granted, because the said motion is timely filed. 
04/21/89 1417-1451 Sanctions in Relation to Discovery 
Point 1. The Involuntary Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions (with 
respect to the defendant Doms' objections to the request for 
production of documents) should be granted, because there is no 
legal or factual basis for the said objections, and several of the 
said objections are directly contrary to the rulings of Judge 
Michael R. Murphy made at hearings held on October 3, 1988, 
and November 10, 1988, with respect to the scope and extent of 
the discovery to be allowed to the said involuntary plaintiffs. 
RECORD 
DATE PAGES SUBJECTS COVERED 
Point 2. The involuntary plaintiffs' motion for sanctions with 
respect to the defendant Doms' objections to the requests for 
admissions should be granted, because there is no legal or factual 
basis for the said objections, and several of the said objections are 
directly contrary to the rulings of Judge Michael R. Murphy made 
at the hearings held on October 3, 1988, and November 10, 1988, 
with respect to the scope and extent of the discovery to be allowed 
to the said involuntary plaintiffs. 
Point 3. The involuntary plaintiffs are entitled to sanctions against 
the defendant Eugene E. Doms in the form of both an order 
compelling the said Doms to file adequate responses to the 
plaintiffs' discovery documents to enable the said plaintiffs to 
adequately prepare for and conduct the deposition of Eugene E. 
Doms, and also in the form of an order requiring the said 
defendant to pay attorneys' fees, costs and other expenses incurred 
by the plaintiffs in connection with their motions for sanctions, 
because the said Doms' objections are made in bad faith, and 
without any basis in law or fact, and are without any merit 
whatsoever. 
08/02/89 1818-1850 Attorney Fees Awarded Against Doms. 
Point 1. The defendant Doms' motion for a separate hearing on 
the issue of attorney fees awarded by Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
should be denied, because Doms has waived his right to such a 
hearing for failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 4-501(a) 
"Motions" of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration which 
requires Doms, as the party opposing the motion for sanctions, to 
make a request for hearing within ten (10) days following the 
involuntary plaintiffs' "request for ruling" or the defendant Doms 
is deemed to have waived his right to a hearing. 
Point 2. The defendant Doms' motion for a separate hearing on 
the issue of attorney fees awarded by Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
should be denied, because (1) Rule 37(a)(4) U.R.C.P. affords a 
party only an "opportunity" for hearing, which opportunity was 
provided in Rule 5-401 (a), which the defendant Doms waived in 
failing to request it within the specified time. (2) The word 
"hearing" as used in Rule 37(a)(4) does not mean "oral argument" 
but is satisfied when the parties are afforded the opportunity of 
affirmatively advancing argument with supporting authority and 
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like opportunity for response and counter-argument by the 
adversary, such as the right to submit written memoranda, 
affidavits, etc., which the defendant Doms did in the instant case. 
(3) Rule 37(a)(4) U.R.C.P. does not require "separate" oral 
argument, but rather allows the issue of attorney fees to be 
consolidated as a "sanction" with the motion to compel discovery. 
Point 3. The Defendant Doms' motion for a separate hearing on 
the issue of attorney fees awarded by Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
should be denied, because the motion is, in effect, a "motion for 
reconsideration" of Judge Frederick's June 22, 1989 order and, as 
such, violates the "law of the case" doctrine established by Judge 
Michael R. Murphy in his rulings pertaining to the November 10, 
1988 hearing. 
Point 4. The defendant Doms' motion for a separate hearing on 
the issue of attorney fees awarded by Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
should be denied, because Doms has already had the opportunity 
to present in writing (including a forty-five (45) page memorandum 
with eight (8) exhibits) all his arguments pertaining to the 
objections he filed to the involuntary plaintiffs' discovery requests. 
Under these circumstances, an oral argument would not and could 
not produce any further or better grounds for his objections than 
the said written objections and memorandum, but would only 
further complicate and congest this court's calendar and escalate 
the costs, fees, and time required for other counsel to prepare for 
and attend said hearing. 
Point 5. The involuntary plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson and Jeanne 
Scott, are entitled to be awarded additional attorney fees and costs 
for services rendered by their attorney in collection with the instant 
memorandum and objections because the defendant Doms' motion 
for a hearing on the issue of attorney's fees is not made in good 
faith, is without merit, violates the provisions of Rule 11, 
U.R.C.P., and also is an unreasonable, unnecessary and frivolous 
attempt by the defendant Doms to thwart the involuntary plaintiffs' 
preparation for the trial of the case. 
—Exhibits— (1) Summit County ruling; (2) order granting 
involuntary plaintiffs' motion for sanctions re Doms' objections to 
involuntary plaintiffs' discovery requests; (3) corrected order of 
court. 
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08/10/89 1996-2062 Attorney Fees for Violation of Court's Order on Discovery, Etc. 
Point 1. Involuntary plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott, 
are entitled to be awarded additional attorney fees and costs for 
services rendered by their attorney in connection with the 
pleadings filed as set forth in the Statement of Material Facts, 
supra, because the defendant Eugene Doms' motions and 
objections as well as his incomplete and evasive responses to the 
plaintiffs' request for production of documents: (1) violate the 
provisions of Judge Michael R. Murphy's "corrected order of the 
court regarding hearing on November 10, 1989," and as such, and 
for other reasons, violate the provisions of rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P."); (2) are an unreasonable, 
unnecessary and frivolous attempt by the defendant Doms to thwart 
the involuntary plaintiffs' preparation for the trial of this case; (3) 
are not made in good faith and are without merit; (4) satisfy the 
provisions of Rules 11, 37(a)(4), 37 (b)(2)URCP and §78-27-56, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, for an award of attorney 
fees. 
08/10/89 2103-2194 Estoppel By Deed Does Not Apply. 
Point 1. The defendant Doms' second amended counterclaim 
should be dismissed as to the involuntary plaintiff Jeanne Scott, 
because it is clear the doctrine of "estoppel by Deed" does not 
apply to the facts in the instant case, in that Jeanne Scott never 
received any "benefits" from the sale of said property and also 
because Doms never relied on Jeanne Scott's signature in 
purchasing the Rossi Hills property. 
03/07/90 3413-3479 Statutes of Limitation and Nonclaim Statute. 
I. Counterclaimants' action against Ellen Anderson as personal 
representative of the estate of D. C. Anderson, deceased, be 
dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of the non-
claim statute in the State of Utah (§75-3-803 Utah Code Ann. 
1953 as amended). 
II. This action, as against the voluntary plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson 
and Jeanne Scott, must be dismissed because the statute of 
limitations applicable to this cause had expired or they were joined 
as parties to this action. 
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HI. The statute of limitations is a bar to the action by the 
counterclaimant Eugene Doms against all of the plaintiffs whether 
they are voluntary or involuntary plaintiffs. 
IV. The failure of counterclaimant Doms to make his claim for 
rescission for over six years constitutes laches and thereby bars the 
equitable claim of rescission. 
V. Restitution is not proper or appropriate as the counterclaimant, 
Eugene Doms, must tender the subject of the real estate transaction 
in order to obtain restitution and the counterclaimant, Eugene 
Doms, must tender the subject of the real estate transaction in 
order to obtain restitution and the counterclaimant, Eugene Doms, 
divested himself of the title to the property on August 20, 1983, 
and did not reacquire title until August 30, 1988. 
VI. The counterclaimant is estopped from claiming restitution or 
damages as he divested his interest in the subject property. 
Further, the payments required by the promissory note were in 
default and a party in default cannot claim rescission. 
4/19/90 4051-4123 Failure of Claim in Rescission. 
I. The counterclaimant has made a claim in rescission. The 
counterclaimant is not entitled to rescission for several reasons: 
A. The counterclaimant has notice of the easement 
immediately upon receiving the deed. 
B. Notice of intention to rescind must be given 
immediately. 
C. The actions of Mr. Doms are incompatible with the 
claim for rescission. 
D. Mr. Doms was never in a position to demand 
rescission. 
E. Intervening events make it impossible to restore the 
parties to their original position. 
II. A party who affirms the contract will not rely on a provision 
of the contract as a basis for disaffirming the contract. 
HI. A person who has divested himself of the title to the property 
cannot claim as title owner for either rescission or damages for 
that person no longer owns the property and has already disposed 
of it for consideration he deemed adequate. 
IV. This action should be dismissed as the action in itself is a 
fraud on the court since the counterclaimant, in order to avoid the 
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payment of his controverted debts, ignored the fact that he sold the 
property to a third party and long after requesting rescission, 
attempted to reacquire the property in order to assert the right to 
rescission or damages. 
V, Counterclaimant Doms acquired no interest in the property by 
reason of a deed from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a corporation. 
VI. Counterclaimant's action against Ellen Anderson as personal 
representative of the estate of D. C. Anderson, deceased, should 
be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of the 
non-claimant statute in the State of Utah (§75-3-803 Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 as amended) 
VH. This action as against the voluntary plaintiffs, Ellen 
Anderson and Jeanne Scott, must be dismissed because the statute 
of limitations applicable to this cause had expired before they were 
joined as parties to this action. 
Vin. The statute of limitations is a bar to the action by the 
counterclaimant Eugene Doms against all of the plaintiffs whether 
they are voluntary or involuntary plaintiffs. 
EX. The case involved an executed contract; therefore, 
purchaser's only remedies are those created by the deed. 
4/24/90 4140-4168 Rescission. 
POINT I. The "Facts" set forth in the defendant Doms' trial brief 
contain several untrue statements and also fail to include testimony 
supporting the position that Doms did not act timely to rescind the 
Rossi Hill sale. 
POINT 2. The defendant Doms cannot rescind the Rossi Hill 
sale, because it is an executed transaction where all documents 
have been signed, delivered, recorded, and the defendant Doms 
has entered into possession of the property. 
Exhibits (Adams v. Reed) 
5/18/90 4205-4225 Nonclaim Statute. 
Statute and cases relating to the non-claim statute (Failure to file 
claim in probate) 
11/20/90 4531-4665 PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO DOMS' PROPOSED 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & JUDGMENT 
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(1) Doms is not entitled to any damages whatsoever because all 
payments made for the purchase of the Rossi Hill property were 
made by the "partnership" of Michael R. McCoy and Eugene E. 
Doms prior to August 30, 1983, and subsequent to August 30, 
1983, all payments were made by Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a 
Utah corporation. 
(2) Doms' proposed findings increased the $83,000 damages 
awarded by the court some $240,000 which are not supported by 
the court's memorandum decision, by the evidence, or by any 
accurate interpretation of the law. 
(3) The court's ruling and Doms' conclusions of law stating 
Doms is "excused from performance," and is not in "default," are 
clearly erroneous because of the doctrine of "Merger" and other 
concepts associated with "executed" contracts and breach of 
covenants of title. 
(4) Doms was never evicted from Rossi Hills and would 
therefor be entitled to only nominal damages. 
(5) Doms' findings and conclusions that he is entitled to 
interest are contrary to the court's oral rulings that "interest" was 
to be decided at a later hearing with attorney fees and other costs. 
Furthermore, Doms is not entitled to any interest on the $83,000 
because the said damages are not subject to prejudgment interest 
under Utah law and further because Doms did not make the 
interest payments himself, rather they were made by other third 
parties not presently before the court, to-wit, the partnership of 
Doms & McCoy, Michael R. McCoy personally, and Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation all of whom made the 
payments to insure their right to the property. 
(6) Doms is not entitled to recover any payments made by 
Michael R. McCoy toward the purchase of the Rossi Hill property. 
(7) The rights the parties have in the Rossi Hill property at the 
present time based on Doms' proposed findings and conclusions 
are something not contemplated by any documents the parties 
signed nor by either of the court's two memorandum decisions. 
(8) As between the estate of D. C. Anderson and the defendant 
Doms, the estate is the prevailing party in civil no. 8339. 
(9) As between the plaintiffs — other than the estate of D. C. 
Anderson — and the defendant Doms, the plaintiffs are the 
prevailing parties in civil no. 8339. 
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(10) The plaintiffs are the prevailing parties with respect to 
counts 1 and 2 in civil no. 10066. 
(11) Jeanne Scott has been denied her "day in court" with 
respect to the jurisdiction issue. 
(12) The "encroachments on Rossi Hill are not legal and they do 
not constitute a boundary line by acquiescence. 
(13) The court's ruling and Doms' proposed conclusions of law 
regarding the status of McHenry Avenue as a "public" or "private" 
road and its relationship to the development of Rossi Hill are 
erroneous. 
(14) The court has misinterpreted Jerry Webber's testimony with 
respect to the fair market value of Rossi Hill with the claimed 
encumbrances or without them. 
(15) The court's refusal to permit any testimony from the three 
expert witnesses as to Rossi Hill's highest and best use as an 
integrated three-parcel development and the court's further refusal 
to allow the three expert witnesses to testify regarding Park City's 
anticipated changes in the zoning for Rossi Hill which would allow 
a planned unit development with clustered multiunit residential 
housing was erroneous and prejudicial. 
(16) The court's conclusion of law that plaintiffs had a duty to 
mitigate Doms' damages is erroneous and is not supported by any 
case dealing with damages for breach of encumbrances in deeds 
which have been signed, delivered and recorded. 
(17) The findings dealing with "utilization" are improper both 
because they are inconsistent with other findings and also because 
they relate to Doms' second cause of action in his counterclaim 
which Doms withdrew during the second segment of the trial in 
August, 1990. 
(18) Doms' finding number 42 is improper because it relates to 
the fraud and misrepresentation issue which has been dismissed by 
the court and withdrawn by Doms. 
11/01/91 5483-5531 To Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
POINT 1. Certain of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment should be amended because: 
(1) The court has failed to make additional findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and to alter and amend the judgment as 
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required by the issues in this case and by the Utah Supreme 
Court's pronouncements by interpretations of Rule 52. 
(2) Certain of the findings of fact are not supported by the 
preponderance of the evidence. 
(3) Certain of the conclusions of law are not a correct 
statement of the law regarding the issues in this case. 
(4) The judgment, to the extent that it is based on the 
erroneous conclusions, is also contrary to law. 
POINT 2. The exact amount of the interest and attorney fees to 
be awarded to plaintiffs pursuant to the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment signed by Judge John A. Rokich 
on September 9, 1991, must be determined and specified in the 
said findings, conclusions, and judgment so the judgment will be 
"final" pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; and also because the plaintiffs need to know the amount 
of the interest and attorney fees to specify the said amounts in the 
notice of default which the court has directed the plaintiffs serve 
on the defendant Doms or his counsel. 
POINT 3. The defendant Doms' Motion to amend the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, regarding the issues of 
when the interest on the trust deed note starts to run, regarding the 
issue as to whether Doms is in default under the trust deed note 
and the trust deed, etc., have already been decided against the 
defendant Doms on numerous occasions and Doms current motion 
is nothing more than a request for a reconsideration of established 
rulings by this court, which rulings constitute the "law of the 
case." Accordingly, Doms motion violates both the letter and the 
spirit of Judge Michael R. Murphy's "corrected order of the court 
regarding the hearing on November 10, 1988" — a copy of which 
is attached to this memorandum as exhibit "2" and is by reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
11/1/91 5483-5531 Exhibits: (Trust Deed Note, corrected Order of the Court 
regarding hearing on November 10, 1988, letter from Judge John 
A. Rokich, trust deed) 
3/6/92 6610-6632 Objections to proposed Supplement to Findings of Fact: 
(1) Objections to proposed finding 17 
(2) Objections to proposed finding 18 
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(3) Objections to proposed finding 23(a) 
(4) Objections to proposed findings 23(b) and (c) 
(5) Objections to proposed finding of fact number 29. The 
plaintiffs object to the failure of the court to find the plaintiffs were 
entitled to additional attorney fees requested by the plaintiffs. 
(6) Objections to proposed finding of fact number 30. The 
plaintiffs object to the failure of the court to find the plaintiffs were 
entitled to additional costs requested by the plaintiffs. 
Objections to proposed Supplement to Conclusions of Law: 
(1) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 1 
(2) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 2 
(3) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 3 
(4) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 4 
(5) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 5 
(6) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 6 
(7) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 8 
(8) Objections to proposed conclusions of law number 9 
Plaintiffs' objections to supplement to judgment: 
(1-8) Objections to paragraph (1-6,8,9) of the proposed judgment 
5/27/92 6800-6838 POINT 1. The "amended findings of fact and conclusions of law" 
and the "amended judgment" dated May 6, 1992, should be 
stricken because the honorable John A. Rokich signed the said 
amended documents prematurely without giving the plaintiffs the 
amount of time allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration to file their objections 
and without any review whatsoever of the said objections. 
POINT 2. The defendant Doms' proposed amended pleadings are 
defective because they do not contain any findings, conclusions , 
or judgment with respect to the issues of attorney fees, costs, 
default of the defendant Doms, etc., and therefore cannot 
constitute a final judgment. 
POINT 3. The defendant Doms' proposed amended pleadings are 
defective because the findings are not supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence and numerous findings are omitted 
by the court which are relevant and necessary to the issues raised 
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by the plaintiffs and further because the conclusions of law and 
judgment are erroneous and contrary to law. 
Amended findings of fact numbers: 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 24, 25, 31, 32, 
34, 44, 45 
Plaintiffs' requested additional findings number 1,2,3 
Amended conclusions of law numbers: 6, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 39, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49 
Amended judgment 
Conclusion 
Exhibit 1 - Amended order regarding November 19, 1991 hearing. 
Exhibit 2 - Plaintiffs motion to amend findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment; and request for oral argument 
Exhibit 3 - Plaintiffs' objections to proposed "supplement to 
findings of fact and conclusions of law" and to "supplement to 
judgment"; and request for oral argument 
5/21/90 260-280 Statute and cases relating to the non-claim statute (failure to file 
claim in probate) attached: Limitations on presentations of claims, 
Robison v. Robison, Halloran - Judge Trust Co v. Heath 
5/21/90 281-299 Statutes and cases on dissolved corporation's powers, Utah code 
Ann. §16-10-101, §59-7-156; Houston v. Utah Lake Land; James 
v. Unknown Trustees; Sharp v. Eagle Lake Lumber Co. 
5/21/90 300-331 Statutes and Authorities in relation to the statute of limitations 
defense 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23; U.R.C.P. Rule 159c); Baker v. 
Pattee; Moroni Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.; Doxey-
Layton Co. v. Clark; Jefferson Insurance Co. of New York v. 
Dunn. 
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